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Electric power systems are undergoing a dramatic change. The penetration of dis-
tributed energy resources (DERs) such as wind turbine generators and photovoltaic panels
is turning a traditional power system into the active distribution network. Power system
situational awareness, which provides critical information for system monitoring and con-
trol, is being challenged by multiple sources of uncertainties such as random meter errors,
stochastic power output of DERs, and imprecise network parameters. On the other hand,
cyber-physical power system operation is vulnerable to cyberattacks against effective state
estimation, such as false data injection attacks (FDIAs). To construct next-generation smart
grids, this dissertation develops a comprehensive situational awareness framework for dis-
tribution system monitoring and control via optimization, machine learning, and artificial
intelligence. Specifically, this dissertation explores advanced model-based and data-driven
methodologies in this framework, including state estimation, cyberattack detection, fault
location, and voltage control.
Firstly, we propose a highly efficient distribution system state estimation (DSSE) method
using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The proposed method
uses the Taylor series of voltages for constructing a linear DSSE model in the interval form
and then solves this model by interval arithmetic, which avoids high calculation costs that
result from a nonlinear iterative process in traditional weighted least square (WLS)-based
methods. Subsequently, a general interval state estimation (ISE) model is developed to
iv
formulate multiple uncertainties. A modified Krawczyk operator in interval arithmetic is
proposed to solve the general ISE model efficiently and provides upper and lower bounds
of state variables. Case studies the developed DSSE method overcomes the traditional
challenges from poor observability due to lack of meters, stochastic outputs of renewables,
and imprecise network parameters, and works conveniently with limited phasor measurement
units (PMUs) in three-phase unbalanced distribution systems. Meanwhile, we seek to develop
fault location via DSSE integrating PMU data in a distributed manner. Based on the graph
model of the feeder, we further perform the decentralized DSSE algorithm in a hierarchical
structure and identify the location of the fault source. The proposed approach captures the
impact of distributed generations on distribution system operation and works with high-level
noises in measurements.
We further apply DSSE to data-driven cyberattack detection and voltage control via
machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI). In the propose semi-supervised learning-
based FDIA detection algorithm, we use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and
feature extraction of measurement datasets and integrate them into advanced generative
adversarial networks (GANs) to detect anomalies by capturing the unconformity between
abnormal and secure measurements. Finally, a model-free volt-VAR optimization (VVO)
algorithm via multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (MADRL) is developed. Numerical
tests show the proposed situational awareness technologies, combining sophistication and
flexibility, are highly applicable to practical distribution systems and have good potential to
improve operation and control efficiency in real-world power grids.
v
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1.1. Power System Situational Awareness
High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) is driving current distribution
systems toward smart next-generation systems [1]. DERs are defined as small power sources
on the distribution systems that produce electricity and are not otherwise included in the
formal definition of the bulk electric system by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) [2]. There are various types of DERs, such as photovoltaic (PV),
electric vehicle (EV), and wind turbine generators (WTGs). DERs have advantages of low
investment costs, low power losses, and flexible operation by unlocking new or existing energy
resources to be developed near customers. Motivated by these benefits, the installation of
DERs have increased significantly worldwide in recent years. As a good example of such an
increment, DERs in the United States have grown almost three times faster than net total
generation capacity (168 GW vs. 57 GW) on a 5-year basis (2015-2019) [3].
This increase brings huge challenges to practical power system and electricity market
operations. The traditional “passive” distribution systems are transforming into an active
network, which requires operators to revise their operation strategies to accommodate the
transition from the traditional top-down power flow to a bottom-up paradigm [4] and update
almost all of their control applications. Moreover, at high levels of DER penetration, electric
power is found to flow back towards the upstream transformer, causing nodal voltages to rise.
This phenomenon leads to an undesirable cycling of voltage regulators and voltage quality
degradation [5]. Besides, the presence of DERs reduces the fault current for downstream
faults and increases the fault current for upstream faults. Therefore, either of them may
exceed the existing current setting, resulting in mal-trip or fail-to-trip of protection devices
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at a certain penetration level [6].
On the other hand, highly relying on the communication infrastructure in the cyber-
physical power systems, the risk and vulnerability of cyber-attacks against power grid oper-
ation increase. For example, in the 2015 Ukrainian power grid cyber-attack event, attackers
intruded the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of distribution net-
works, which leads to a power outage involving 225,000 customers [7]. Liu et al. presented
an false data injection attack (FDIA) algorithm against dc state estimation to avoid being
detected by conventional bad data detection (BDD) methods [8]. Since then, researchers
devote significant efforts to investigating the FDIA detection methods. These attacks that
can successfully circumvent the BDD methods are defined as unobservable cyber-attacks.
Distribution systems are also vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their direct connections to
customer loads and emerging distributed generators (DGs) [9].
As a typical component for distribution automation, power system situational awareness,
represented by state estimation, enables continuous and reliable monitoring and control of
distribution system operation with DER penetration. This technology is paramount in prac-
tice as it allows distribution system operators (DSOs) to perceive the operating status of
the system and make decisions. Various control-room applications contain state estimation,
topology identification, fault management, cyberattack mitigation, and voltage control, etc.
However, the existing situational awareness technologies in transmission systems cannot be
trivially applied to typical distribution systems. The reason originates from several consid-
erable differences between electric transmission and distribution systems:
• Radial or weakly-meshed networks: The vast majority of distribution systems
operate in radial configurations for practical engineering concerns, which distinguishes
distribution networks from transmission systems that generally have multiple loops.
The weakly-meshed structure guarantees the system reliability against contingencies
or scheduled maintenance.
• Poor Observability: Distribution systems may be unobservable due to data missing
and lack of real-time meters, especially phasor measurement units (PMUs), which
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means that the number of metering instruments in a network is generally limited. In
contrast, transmission systems have a high measurement redundancy due to prevalent
PMU installation.
• Low x/r ratio: Low reactance to resistance ratio in distribution lines make conven-
tional Newton-Raphson power flow and state estimation algorithms in transmission
systems fail at a distribution level [10].
• Unbalanced operation: Distribution systems are highly unbalanced in practice,
resulting in higher complexity in the formulation of power flow calculation and distri-
bution system state estimation (DSSE). This unbalanced property is reflected not only
in the different network parameters (or loads) on each phase but also in the existences
of single-phase and two-phase branches.
• “Invisible” network configuration: The complete data of network topology are not
commonly stored [11]. Moreover, the topology information in distribution networks is
often not available at the low-voltage level due to uninformed changes that frequently
happen [12].
These characteristics of distribution systems increase the challenges and difficulties of
system operation and control. As a result, accurate and effective modeling and methodology
of power system situational awareness call for holistic improvement.
1.2. Research Objectives and Achievements
Active distribution systems emerge with extensive DERs aggregating on the demand
side. Quantitatively assessing these impacts of DER uncertainty on these active distribution
systems via DSSE becomes more necessary. On the other hand, data-driven approaches,
which exploit valuable information by abundant real-time and historical data from periodic
patterns of power systems, hold the promise to enhance operational efficiency of distribution
system operation. In pursuit of these goals, we have pioneered a general theoretical frame-
work that advances statistical theory, optimization, and machine learning for distribution
system monitoring and control.
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Figure 1.1. Research scheme of this dissertation for distribution system monitoring and
control.
Fig. 1.1 depicts the general schematic of a model-based and data-driven situational
awareness framework. In the framework, the uncertain power outputs of DER are modeled
by diverse techniques and then deemed as the inputs of DSSE along with measurements
to depict the system states. Meanwhile, the random noises from meters and malicious
cyber-attacks against these measurements degrade the estimation accuracy. Further DSSE-
based applications appear across voltage control, topology identification, and cyberattack
mitigation. Specifically, the main contributions and achievements of this dissertation are
outlined below.
1.2.1. Innovation: Preparing for DER Uncertainty
The variability and intermittency of DER outputs pose significant uncertainty to system
operation; besides, measurements with noises and imprecise line parameters because of aging
also result in uncertain inputs to DSSE. In the meantime, the reliability events represented
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by faults and cyberattacks bring immense uncertainty factors to normal system operation.
All these issues result in stringent requirements for system modeling and operation practices.
DSSE & Renewable Integration. To capture the impacts of these uncertainties from
DER outputs, imprecise line parameters, and measurements with noises, we develop a general
framework of interval state estimation (ISE) leveraging the heterogeneous measurements
from SCADA systems and the emerging PMUs. Our proposed algorithms obtain the upper
and lower bounds of state variables for better monitoring power grids under the coordinated
impacts of multiple uncertainties. In brief, we see through these uncertainties by ISE and
realize 100x acceleration compared with the conventional weighted least square (WLS)-based
methods based on Monte Carlo simulation in this field. Towards a 100% renewable power
grid in the near future, where significant uncertainty produces a far-reaching influence on
system operation, the proposed ISE algorithm will be a promising candidate for effective
solutions to uncertainty analysis.
DSSE & Fault Location. Fast and accurate fault location helps the utilities to clear
the faults and accelerate system restoration; however, this is a challenging task as the bidi-
rectional power flow due to the increasing penetration of DERs leads to the mal-trip or
fail-to-trip of conventional protection devices and imprecise fault location. To mitigate the
impacts, a graph-based fault location algorithm in distribution networks is proposed by ad-
vanced DSSE techniques integrating PMU data. This faulted-line location method running
in a decentralized manner has a lower computation cost and enables fast fault location within
15 milliseconds, which shows the application potential in larger-scale systems. The proposed
approach captures the impact of DER penetration on distribution system operation, and its
location performance is independent of fault types and fault impedances. Furthermore, the
proposed algorithm is robust against high-level noises in measurements.
1.2.2. Integration: Transforming the Grid with Big Data, Machine Learning, and Artificial
Intelligence
With the fast development of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) that collects a
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massive volume of data, machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) techniques
are widely applied to power system operation due to their powerful capability of extracting
useful information and flexible extensibility. Based on DSSE, this dissertation further focus
on developing data-driven AI-based methods for upgrading the monitoring and control of
electric distribution systems with high penetration of DERs.
DSSE & Cyberattack Detection. The high dependence of cyber-physical power sys-
tems on information technology increases vulnerability from malicious cyberattacks. Con-
sidering the high dimensionality and correlated nature of power system measurements, the
advanced ML technique using PMU data is applied to cyberattack detection and mitiga-
tion. Autoencoders are integrated into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN)
framework, which detects abnormal measurements under the unobservable cyberattacks by
capturing the unconformity between anomalies and secure measurements. Also, because of
the expensive labeling costs and potential missing labeled data in practical systems, this
method only requires unlabeled data and a few labeled data from measuring instruments
by leveraging a powerful generation capability of GAN and thus is semi-supervised learning.
Specifically, the proposed method with as few as 1000 labeled training data self-learns with
an accurate detection ability of higher than 95%.
DSSE & Voltage Control. Encouraged by AlphaGo’s big hit, a real-time volt-VAR
optimization (VVO) paradigm is developed to support distribution system operators in ef-
fective voltage control via deep reinforcement learning (DRL). This work is the first attempt
to apply such an innovative AI technique to VVO control on voltage regulating devices
in distribution systems. This method realizes power loss reduction and voltage regulation
concurrently. In brief, under time-varying operating conditions, this work enables a power
distribution grid to self-learn with the “cognitive” function of system operation by mimicking
the human mind. Furthermore, by assigning the global control variables to multiple DRL
agents with effective information exchange, the proposed method addresses the scalability




The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 proposes a novel and highly efficient DSSE algorithm with measurements from
SCADA systems. The proposed method uses the Taylor series of voltages for constructing a
linear DSSE model in the interval form and then solves this model by interval arithmetic.
Chapter 3 extends the work proposed in Chapter 2 and proposes a general ISE framework
in DSSE integrating PMU data in unbalanced distribution systems. The proposed model
simultaneously formulates multiple uncertainties in unbalanced distribution systems by in-
terval arithmetic. Moreover, this model can accommodate partially available measurements
of DG outputs and inaccurate line parameters. A modified Krawczyk-operator algorithm
is proposed to solve the general ISE model, and effectively provides the upper and lower
bounds of state variables under coordinated impacts of these uncertainties.
Chapter 4 proposes a graph-based faulted line identification algorithm using a limited
number of PMUs. The proposed method first applies a distributed DSSE algorithm to
efficiently restrict the searching region for the fault source in the feeder between two adjacent
PMUs. Based on the graph model of the feeder in the reduced searching region, this method
performed in a hierarchical structure further identifies the location of the fault source.
Chapter 5 explores the advanced semi-supervised learning technique for detecting cy-
berattack against DSSE. Autoencoders are integrated into a GAN framework, which detects
abnormal measurements under the unobservable cyberattacks by capturing the unconformity
between anomalies and secure measurements.
Chapter 6 develops a model-free VVO algorithm via multi-agent DRL, where the forward-
backward sweep method for DSSE provides power flow results within a few iterations as the
DRL environment. The VVO problem in unbalanced distribution networks is cast to an
intelligent deep Q-network framework, which avoids solving a specific optimization model
directly when facing time-varying system operating conditions.
Finally, a conclusion of this dissertation and future works unveiled during the research
efforts are discussed in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Towards Highly Efficient State Estimation with SCADA Measurements in
Distribution Systems
2.1. Motivation
Distribution systems are undergoing radical changes in operation and control, which
calls for effective situation awareness techniques [13]. Distribution system state estimation
(DSSE) converts redundant meter readings and other available information into an estimate
of system states and thus develops into a subject of active research [14]. The measurements
can be the voltage magnitudes, power injections, and power flows from supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, or voltage and current phasor recorded by phasor
measurement units (PMUs) [15]. Monte Carlo simulations (MCSs) [16] are widely used to
obtain measurements samplings including noises owing to the assumption that these noises
follow Gaussian distributions. Also, traditional nonlinear DSSE methods adopt the Gauss-
Newton method based on the WLS criterion to perform the iterative estimation process.
Besides, to correctly evaluate the estimation performance, the number of the required samples
in MCSs is tremendous, which brings a heavy computation load to the WLS-based methods
[13].
To mitigate the deficiency of MCSs, analytical methods such as nonlinear program-
ming [17, 18] are proposed to provide the upper and lower bounds of all possible state vari-
ables that meet all constraints from measurements. For instance, the authors of [17] used
a constrained nonlinear programming approach to obtain the ranges of states in transmis-
sion systems, while [18] extends this boundary optimization method to distribution systems
with PMU installation. However, the method in [18] requires the installation of PMUs in
distribution systems. Due to lack of PMUs in some distribution systems, the metering data
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recorded by SCADA systems and pseudo-measurements collected at loads or distributed
generators (DGs) are widely used in the existing DSSE methods [15]. Moreover, these mea-
surements lead to nonlinear DSSE models that are iteratively solved, and thus the process is
time-consuming. This chapter presents a highly efficient DSSE method to handle the uncer-
tainty of random measurement noises. The main contributions of the proposed method are
concluded as (i) constructing a novel DSSE model to avoid multiple runs of the WLS-based
DSSE procedure and (ii) accelerating accurate state estimates by interval arithmetic with
no requirements of PMU data.
2.2. Conventional DSSE
2.2.1. State Estimation Theory
In classical state estimators, the relationship between redundant measurements and state
variables is depicted as:
z = h(x) + e (2.1)
where x is an n-dimension state vector, and z is an m-dimension measurement vector; h(x) is
the measurement function about x; the measurement noise vector e obeys a Gaussian distri-
bution e ∼ N(0,R) is a covariance matrix and is usually considered diagonal (for instance,
see [19]), R = diag [σ21, σ
2




i denotes the variance of the ith measurement
error, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The state variables are obtained via a WLS criterion that minimizes the sum of weighted
measurement residuals J as:
x̂ = arg min J = arg min[z − h(x)]TW [z − h(x)] (2.2)
where W is a weight matrix of measurements to quantify the trust levels of diverse mea-
surements, and W = R−1.
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Optimal estimated states are solved iteratively by the Gauss-Newton method until each
component of the vector ∆x at each iteration is sufficiently small:
∂J/∂x = H(x)TW [z − h(x)] = 0 (2.3)
H(x)TWH(x)∆x = H(x)TW [z − h(x)] (2.4)
x(t+1) = x(t) + ∆x (2.5)
where H(x) is the Jacobian matrix of the measurement function with respect to x, and
H(x) = ∂h(x)/∂x.
2.2.2. Formulation of DSSE
In the conventional DSSE methods, SCADA systems provide the metering data of volt-
age magnitudes and powers, and pseudo-measurements are also used to achieve the system
observability. Also, the substation acts as a slack bus [15].
The system states are usually chosen as the voltage phasors at all buses and expressed
as
x = [v1, v1, · · · , vn] (2.6)
where vj denotes the voltage phasor at bus j and j = 1, . . . , n; n is the number of buses in
the system.
The vector of measurements, z, in DSSE generally includes 1) voltage and current pha-
sors from distribution-level PMUs, 2) power flows recorded by supervisory control and data
acquisition systems, and 3) power injections from smart meters or pseudo-measurements,
including load consumption and DG [20]. The DSSE model is nonlinear since PMUs are not
installed at each node in a practical distribution system [10].
Denote the voltage at node k as V k and the current at branch i- j as I ij, k ∈ ψV and
{i, j} ∈ ψI ; ψV and ψI are the sets of nodes and branches with voltage/current measurements
10
from limited PMUs installed in the distribution system. Power measurements exist at node
k or branch i- j, {i, j} or k ∈ ψS is the set of load/DG nodes or the branches installed with
a meter.
The measurement function of the three-phase voltage measurement at node k, k ∈ ψV ,
can be depicted as









The relationship between the current measurement at branch i- j and the state can be
expressed as:













where Y ij denotes the line admittance at this branch.
The complex power measurements at node k or at branch i- j can be expressed as a
nonlinear relationship about the states as
Sk = vk · (Ik)∗ (2.9)
Sij = vi · (I ij)∗ (2.10)
where the power flow measurement Sij ∈ C3×1 and the power injection measurement Sk ∈
C3×1; vk and vi denote the estimated voltages at node k and i, respectively, and come from
the corresponding elements in x; Further, I ij can be obtained by (2.8), and the current








= Y kvk, where Y k ∈ C
3×3 denotes
the nodal admittance.
The DSSE model in the complex form is expressed as
z = [V k, I ij,Sk,Sij]
T = h(x) + e (2.11)
Due to the nonlinear relationships between the voltages and the power measurements,
the model (2.11) is nonlinear. The DSSE process in the three-phase distribution system is
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iteratively implemented in the following steps [21]:
1) Backward Sweep: Get initial values of branch currents by a backward approach. An initial
voltage at each node is set as the substation voltage, i.e., ṽi = V slack , and (2.12) is used to
calculate the current injections is calculated as through nodal power injections:
Ik eq = (Sk/ṽi)
∗ (2.12)
Next, these injections are used to obtain branch currents.
2) Forward Sweep: The branch currents in step 1) and the substation voltage are used to
calculate initial nodal voltages, x0.











4) Update the nodal voltages by xt+1 = xt + ∆xt.
5) If ∆xt is less than a pre-set tolerance, stop the iterative process. Otherwise, go to step
3).
2.3. Proposed Methodology
2.3.1. DSSE Modeling in Interval Arithmatic
A linear approximation is developed in this section. Define ∆Vk = 1 − Vk, where Vk
denotes the voltage phasor at bus k. Considering the small voltage drops along the distribu-
tion lines and the normal voltage limits (0.95 ∼ 1.05 p.u.) in practical systems [22], apply
the Taylor series of ∆Vk around zero as 1(1 −∆Vk) =
∑∞
n=0(∆Vk)
n. Further, the following
equation is obtained by ignoring the high order terms [23]:
1/(1−∆Vk) ≈ 1 + ∆Vk = 2− Vk (2.14)
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Figure 2.1. Schematic diagram of the proposed linearization. (a) The complex plane of Vk.
(b) Approximation loss F (Vk)
Fig.2.1 depicts the accuracy loss introduced by (2.14) as F (Vk) =
1
Vk
− (2− Vk), and for




is used for constructing the measurement functions in the proposed DSSE model, which are
shown below.
1) Power Flow Measurements From SCADA System
The power flow measurements Pik and Qik at branch i–k are expressed as
Sik = Pik + jQik = Vi[yik(Vi − Vk)]∗ (2.15)
where Pik and Qik denote the real and reactive powers at this branch; yik denotes the nodal
admittance between buses i and k, and the function [·]∗ represents the complex conjugate;
Vi and Vk denote the voltage phasors at these two buses.
Apply (2.14) to (2.15), and a closed-form expression is obtained.
Sik(2− Vi) = Vi[yik(Vi − Vk)]∗ (2.16)




i − y∗ikV ∗k = 2Sik.
2) Power Injection Measurements From SCADA System or Pseudo-measurements
The measurement function of the power injection at bus k holds below, and similar to
(2.15), further expressed as a linear one.
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Sk = Pk + jQk = Vk
∑
l∈N(k)




[ylk(Vl − Vk)]∗ (2.18)
where Pk and Qk denote the real and reactive powers at bus k, and N(k) is the set of all
buses connected to bus k.
3) Voltage Magnitudes From SCADA System
The measurement function of voltage magnitudes at bus k is approximated as
Vk =
√
(V 2k,r + V
2
k,x ≈ Vk,r (2.19)
where Vk,r and Vk,x represent the real and imaginary parts of voltages at bus k, and the small
angle differences of distribution lines are considered, e.g., 0.1 degrees per mile [2].
Reorganize the linear equations (2.16), (2.18), and (2.19) as
BV +DV ∗ = E (2.20)
where V denotes the vector of the nodal voltage phasors, and B, D, and E are the corre-
sponding coefficient matrices and suppressed here due to the limited space. Further, express
(2.20) in rectangular coordinates as
Br +Dr −Bx +Dx








where the subscripts r and x denote the real and imaginary parts of complex numbers. For
simplicity, (2.21) is expressed as





 denotes the state vector; A =
Br +Dr −Bx +Dx
Bx +Dx Br −Dr
, and A ∈ Rm×n ;
rank(A)=n, i.e., a full rank; b =
Er
Ex
 and b ∈ Rm×1.
Note that (2.22) does not consider measurement noises and involves various levels of
approximation on the voltage magnitudes and powers. Next, based on (2.22), we use interval
arithmetic to handle these accuracy losses in DSSE. We consider the measurement noises
by updating (2.22) to an interval equation, where an interval number is defined as [a] =
[al, au] = {a ∈ R |al≤a≤au}, and interval vectors and matrices are constructed similarly [24].
According to the 3σ rule of a Gaussian distribution, where σ denotes the standard deviation,
99.73% of values from the distribution are within three times of standard deviations [2].
Hence, the maximum measurement errors (i.e.,∓3σ) are superposed onto the corresponding
measurements to obtain the lower and upper bounds of A and b, i.e., [A] and [b]. By this
relaxation, these measurement intervals enclose their true values.
2.3.2. Solution in Interval Arithmetic
This section presents a novel solving method towards the linear DSSE model by further
taking into account measurement noises based on (2.22). Also, interval arithmetic [24] is used
to handle the accuracy loss introduced by the linear approximation and these measurement
noises in the DSSE process.
The proposed method considers the measurement noises by updating (2.22) to an interval
equation, where an interval number is defined as [a] = [al, au] = {a ∈ R | al ≤ a ≤ au}, and
an interval vector and matrix are constructed similarly. The maximum measurement errors
(±3σ, and σ is the standard deviation of a Gaussian distribution) are superposed onto the
corresponding measurements to obtain the lower and upper bounds of A and b, i.e., [A] and












where I ∈ Rm×m is an identity matrix, and [y] ∈ Rm×1.
Compactly express (2.23) as [A][X] = [B], and the interval symbol [·] is omitted below,
e.g., the augmented state vector X =
[x]
[y]
. Equation (2.23) is solved by a Krawczyk-
operator algorithm. An initial interval solution X(0) is calculated by
X(0) = ([−α, α], . . . , [−α, α])T (2.24)
where α = ‖CB‖∞/(1 − β) and β = ‖I − CA‖∞; C is a preconditioning point matrix,
C−1=Mid[A], and Mid[·] is the medium of intervals; ‖·‖∞ denotes the infinite norm of a
vector, and this initial solution X(0) contains the final solution.
The following process at iteration j is used to gradually approach the final solution hull
until ‖X(j+1) −X(j)‖∞≤ ε:
X(j+1) = (CB + (I −CA)X(j)) ∩X(j) (2.25)
where ε = 10−4. It is proved that starting from X(0), the iterative process rapidly converges
if ‖I −CA‖< 1, and ‖·‖ is any norm [24].
The final state estimate of x in the proposed DSSE model is obtained by Mid[X(j+1)]
considering that the measurement noises follow symmetric Gaussian distributions about zero
means.
2.4. Numerical Test
We test the proposed algorithm on the IEEE 34-bus distribution system [25]. The system
is modified by adding four DGs , shown as Fig. 2.2:, and the installed capacity of each DG
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Table 2.1. Measurement arrangement in test systems
Measurements Location
SCADA
|V | 1, 11, 20, 25
P, Q 1-2, 4-6, 13-15, 20-23,30-31
Pseudo-meas. P, Q All load nodes and DG nodes
Figure 2.2. IEEE 34-bus distribution system
is 200 kVA. The maximum errors of measurements are set as 1% of these true values for the
voltage magnitudes and powers from SCADA systems and 20% for pseudo-measurements.
Table 2.1 displays the measurement placement scheme in the test system.
2.4.1. Estimation Performance
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, we adopt the nonlinear WLS-based
method in (2.1)-(2.5) as the baseline. In Fig. 2.3, the maximum absolute errors (MAEs) of
the real and imaginary parts of voltages in 1000 MCSs are used to evaluate the estimation
accuracy of the nonlinear WLS-based method in [15]. Also, using measurements from one
of these MCSs, we calculate the errors of the estimated voltages by the proposed method.
Fig. 2.3 implies that the WLS-based method in MCSs may produce the MAEs that reach up
to around 5.34×10−3 p.u., while the proposed method obtains accurate estimates with the
17
maximum error 1.54×10−3 p.u. The root mean square errors (RMSEs) of these estimated
voltages in all MCSs are used to evaluate the overall estimation performance of this nonlinear
DSSE method.
 
Figure 2.3. Comparison in the estimation errors of the proposed method and the MAEs that
may happen in a random sampling of measurements.
Moreover, the maximums of the RMSEs are compared with the MAEs of the proposed
method at all buses, shown in Table 2.2. In contrast to the WLS-based method in a Monte
Carlo trial, the proposed method obtains the states more accurately. Also, the estimation
accuracy of our method is close to that of the baseline method in 1000 MCSs, and however,
the latter requires considerable sets of samplings.
Table 2.2 compares the computational efficiency of the proposed method with that of
the WLS-based method. The CPU time of the proposed method accounts for about 12% of
the average one that this nonlinear method takes in a single Monte Carlo trial, i.e., 20.30 vs
174.79 milliseconds.
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Table 2.2. Comparison in accuracy and computation time
Algorithm Type
Maximum Errors or RMSEs [p.u.]
CPU Time
Real Part Imaginary Part
Proposed Method 1.541×10−3 1.451×10−4 20.30 [ms]
WLS-based DSSE 1.681×10−3 1.842×10−4 174.7 [s] for 1000 trials
2.4.2. Robustness Analysis
This section discusses influence factors, such as operating condition and measurement
redundancy, to illustrate the robustness of the proposed method.
Considering the impacts of DG penetration on voltage profile, we investigate the esti-
mation results of the proposed method in various operation ranges, i.e., 0.90∼0.95 p.u. and
0.9∼1.1 p.u., shown in Table 2.3. The comparison between these cases illustrates that a
narrower voltage range around 1.0 leads to higher estimation accuracy and computational
efficiency of the proposed method. Table 2.3 validates the robustness of this method for
various operating conditions.
Table 2.3. Estimation performance in robustness analysis
Robustness Analysis
Maximum Errors or RMSEs [p.u.] CPU Time
Real Part Imaginary Part [ms]
Voltage Profile
0.90∼0.95 1.652×10−3 1.607×10−3 20.43
0.90∼1.1 1.831×10−3 1.793×10−3 21.41
Measurement Redun.
1.221 1.330×103 1.693×10−4 18.30
1.265 1.029×103 1.642×10−4 17.11
The measurement redundancy shown in Table 2.1 is 1.176, and we further test the pro-
posed algorithm with other measurement redundancies by adjusting the number of measure-
ments and their locations. Table 2.3 gives the estimation performance of these tests, which
shows that the efficacy of this method does not depend on the measurement arrangements.
Also, the higher measurement redundancy leads to the overall improvement in estimation
accuracy and computational efficiency.
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In Fig. 2.2, the maximum absolute errors (MAEs) of the real and imaginary parts of
voltages in 1000 times of MCSs are used to evaluate the estimation accuracy of the nonlinear
DSSE method in [15]; Fig. 3 also lists the errors of the estimated voltages in the proposed
method. It implies in Fig.3 that a single Monte Carlo trial may produce significant estimation
errors that reach up to around 5.34× 103 p.u., while the proposed method obtains accurate
estimates with the maximum error 1.54 × 103 p.u. The root mean square errors (RMSEs)
of these estimated voltages in all MCSs are also used to evaluate the overall estimation
performance of this nonlinear DSSE method. Moreover, the maximums of the RMSEs at all
nodes are compared with those of the errors of the proposed method, shown in Table 2.3. It
concludes that in contrast to a Monte Carlo trial, the proposed method estimates the states
via a single run accurately and robustly; the estimation accuracy of this method is close to
that of 1000 MCSs, which require considerable sets of samplings and high computational
cost.
2.5. Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter presents a highly efficient DSSE algorithm using the Taylor series of com-
plex numbers and interval arithmetic techniques. The proposed method provides a highly
efficient substitute of nonlinear DSSE methods without the use of PMU measurements. Nu-
merical simulations illustrate the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method in tackling
nonlinear measurements with Gaussian noises.
Owing to the characteristics of distribution systems, several other factors associated
with distributed energy resource (DER) penetrations further increase the challenges and
difficulties of DSSE, which are delineated as follows:
Accurate point forecasts for DER outputs are difficult. The power outputs of
DERs are mostly dependent upon the weather conditions and multiple ambient factors. Wind
speed is regarded as a typical deciding factor of wind power, while the power generation of
a photovoltaic cell mainly depends on solar radiation and ambient temperature [26]. Since
accurate quantification of wind speed or solar radiation is difficult to obtain, their forecasting
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errors inevitably lead to considerable forecasting errors of DER outputs [27].
DER operates with unbalanced and bidirectional power flows. Conventional
distribution power flows in one direction, i.e., from central power plants to customers, while
the reverse flow from customers to the grid occurs with DERs integrated. In addition,
practical power systems at the distribution level operate with unbalanced power flow, which
is usually the case where multiple DERs are installed in distribution systems [26].
Lack of meters at DER installations. Due to currently limited metering and com-
munication infrastructure, distribution systems are generally underdetermined with poor
observability. Besides, the assumption that measurement devices are mounted at DER
installations might be impractical owing to the lack of specific agreements between DER
operators and distribution system operators (DSOs) [28].
Spatial correlations of DER outputs. DERs that belong to the same geographical
area present similarity in power outputs. Weather conditions and field operations (e.g.,
active power curtailment or reactive generation control) affect the correlation between DERs
at different nodes of the system [29].
All the above challenges deserve further investigation. Therefore, by updating the pro-
posed DSSE algorithm in this chapter, Chapter 3 will formulate the uncertainty from DER




Interval State Estimation with Uncertainty of Distributed Generation and Line
Parameters Integrating PMU Data
3.1. Literature Review
Distribution system state estimation (DSSE) is largely driven by the diffusion of dis-
tributed generation (DG) such as wind turbine generators (WTGs) and photovoltaic (PV)
panels [30]. DG has advantages of low investment costs, flexible and eco-friendly operations,
and low power losses. However, the variability and intermittency of DG pose significant
uncertainty to DSSE [31]. Apart from the uncertainty from these emerging DG units, inputs
to DSSE also contain measurements with noises and imprecise line parameters. For example,
the uncertainty of line parameters originates from varying field ambient conditions and aging
wirings. While the uncertainty of measurements is commonplace and their impacts on the
DSSE are investigated in [32], multiple other uncertainties besides DG uncertainty in DSSE
call for innovative solutions.
Uncertainty studies that account for the variable and stochastic nature of input data
in conventional DSSE are pursued by Monte Carlo (MC) simulation, as reviewed in [13].
In these studies, DG power outputs are assumed available in real time via measuring in-
struments installed by distribution system operators (DSOs) [33] or in the form of pseudo-
measurements that follow Gaussian distributions [34]. Nevertheless, these assumptions might
be impractical due to 1) currently limited metering and communication infrastructure, and
2) lack of specific agreements between DG operators and DSOs [28]. Moreover, the stochastic
nature of DG outputs weakens the assumption that the DG outputs follow a known family
of parametric distributions [15]. As discussed in [17, 26, 35–40], the statistical data of DG
outputs are a prerequisite in MC simulation, however, such information may not be available
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in practice. In addition, these methods based on MC simulation require plenty of runs for
various combinations of measurement samplings and/or DG outputs and thus are generally
applied for evaluating the overall accuracy of state estimators [32].
Motivated by the deficiencies of these methods, interval state estimation (ISE) is proposed
to obtain the boundaries of state variables, which provide more intuitive information such
as the upper and lower bounds of these states [17]. In ISE, all data with uncertainty are
modeled as inputs in the interval form, since the upper and lower limits are available in most
practical cases. For example, the range of line parameters can be specified (e.g., within ±
5% of their nominal values) [40].
Boundary optimization methods such as [17, 35–37] are proposed to address the ISE
problem by maximizing and minimizing the state variables that meet all constraints from
measurements. For instance, in [17], a constrained nonlinear programming approach using
the measurements from supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems is used
to obtain the ranges of states in transmission systems. The solving method is applied to
distribution systems in [37]. However, with more PMUs or micro-PMUs emerging at the
distribution level, this approach cannot deal with hybrid measurements including PMU data.
Moreover, the authors of [37] did not consider the uncertainty of line parameters. In addition,
the limitation of these optimization-based methods is that lower and upper bounds of each
state variable need to be computed separately, and thus the total number of the optimization
models for all states proliferates with the scale of the distribution systems. This leads to
their low efficiency in the solving process.
Recent efforts to apply interval arithmetic to study uncertainties in power system opera-
tions are noteworthy, such as power flow calculation in [38], reliability evaluation in [39], and
ISE in [40] and [41]. In ISE, interval arithmetic deals with the uncertain inputs that lie within
a certain interval and enables the direct computation towards the bounds of state variables.
For instance, focusing on transmission systems, an ISE model with only PMU measurements
is formulated as interval linear equations in [40], and the ranges of states with the line param-
eter uncertainty are solved. However, such a high PMU deployment is not available at the
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distribution level, and the impacts of DG uncertainty are not considered. Further research
is conducted in active distribution systems. In [41], an iterative Krawczyk-operator algo-
rithm is used to obtain interval states, which takes the solution solved by interval Gaussian
elimination (IGE) as initial values of the states. Nevertheless, IGE presents the drawback
of “wrapping effect”, where the widths of intervals expand since each interval variable is
treated independently. When IGE is applied to distribution systems with high uncertainty,
this over-conservatism is further intensified. As a result, the IGE-based Krawczyk operator
(IKO) is computationally expensive to obtain final states since the initial states are far from
them [37]. In addition, all DG outputs in [41] are assumed to obey Gaussian distributions.
As mentioned above, this assumption may not be practical.
To sum up, the existing studies still lack generality in modeling to formulate multiple
uncertainties, and most of them focus on the modeling for a single type of uncertainty in
DSSE. Moreover, the direct impacts of uncertain DG outputs on DSSE are not fully addressed
in unbalanced distribution systems. The existing ISE methods are established on the strong
assumptions that the probability information or real-time measurements of DG outputs are
available. In addition, the limitations of the solution strategies for the existing ISE models,
including conservative estimation results and time-consuming solving process, persist.
We propose a novel and fast ISE algorithm considering multiple uncertainties of DG
outputs and line parameters in unbalanced distribution systems. As a solid reference to
DSOs, the upper and lower bounds of state variables are provided by the proposed algorithm
with hybrid SCADA and PMU measurements. First, based on the interval prediction for
DG power outputs, an ISE model is formulated in interval arithmetic. Moreover, the model
consider the line parameter uncertainty, and a weighted least square (WLS) criterion is
integrated to deal with these hybrid measurements. Finally, a modified Krawczyk-operator
(MKO) algorithm, which enables fast and accurate computation towards the bounds of state
variables, is presented to obtain the interval solution of the proposed ISE model.
3.2. Hybrid DSSE Algorithm and Interval Arithmetic
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3.2.1. DSSE with Hybrid Measurements
Recent research interests focus on the applications of PMUs to DSSE, since PMUs mea-
sure voltage and current phasors with high sampling precision and short update cycles [28].
Considering that a limited number of PMUs are installed in distribution systems due to
their high technical and financial costs, hybrid state estimators incorporate conventional
SCADA data with PMU data to improve estimation accuracy. Moreover, by adopting the
state variables in the rectangular form, hybrid DSSE integrating PMU data results in a linear
estimator, while conventional estimators with SCADA data are nonlinear [14].
Based on [13] and [42], the hybrid estimator in [43] is used owing to its improved and
recognized performance, where the voltage at a slack node (i.e., a substation) and branch
currents are chosen as state variables. In three-phase distribution systems, the state vector
















where va,b,cslack,r and v
a,b,c
slack,x are the real and imaginary parts of the three-phase substation
voltage, and ia,b,clr and i
a,b,c
lx are the real and imaginary parts of the three-phase current at
branch l, l = 1, 2, . . . , N . The superscripts a, b, and c denote the phase indices.
In the hybrid estimator, power flows and power injections at loads are obtained by
SCADA systems or pseudo-measurements, while PMUs provide the magnitude and phase an-
gle measurements of voltages and currents. Moreover, the three-phase power measurements
are converted into equivalent currents by












where zIkr and zIkx (or zIpr and zIpx) are the real and imaginary parts of the current at node
k (or at branch p), and Vk and Vp are the voltage phasors at node k and connected to branch
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p, respectively; zPk and zQk (or zPp and zQp) denote the active and reactive powers at node
k (or at branch p). [·]∗ denotes the complex conjugate.
The hybrid DSSE process in an unbalanced distribution system is iteratively implemented
in the following steps [42]:
1. Backward Sweep: Get initial values of branch currents by a backward approach. An
initial voltage at each node is set as the substation voltage Vslack, and (3.2) is used to
calculate current injections through nodal power injections as follows:






Next, these injections are used to obtain branch currents.
2. Forward Sweep: The branch currents in step 1 and the substation voltage are used
to calculate initial nodal voltages.
3. Calculate h(x), and then update system state variables as
∆xk = (HT (xk)WH(xk))
−1
HT (xk)W [z − h(xk)] (3.5)
4. Update the branch currents by xk+1 = xk + ∆xk, then calculate nodal voltages by
forward sweep in step 2.
5. If ∆xk is less than a pre-set tolerance, stop the iterative process. Otherwise, use these
updated voltages to calculate the equivalent currents by (3.2) and (3.3), then go to
step 3.
To improve the computational efficiency in the above iterative process, a linear approx-
imation technique in [44] is used, where each nodal voltage is fixed as Vslack to calculate
equivalent currents in (3.2) and (3.3). This approximation is based on two observations for
practical distribution systems, that 1) the voltage drops along feeders do not exceed 5%,
since voltage phase differences are very small [22], and 2) nodal voltages are usually kept
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within normal operation limits (0.95 to 1.05 p.u.) [45]. Then, the Jacobian matrix is inde-
pendent of x and highly sparse, and the general formulas (2.3) and (2.4) are updated with
h(x) = Hx as:




The constant Jacobian elements of this estimator are briefly listed below, and more details
about H can be referred to [43].
1) PMU voltage measurements
For the PMU voltage at node k, the measurement function is shown as
h(x) = ha,b,cVkr + jh
a,b,c
Vkx








where Ik denotes a set of line segments from the slack node to node k, and p ∈ Ik ; zp is




pr , and i
a,b,c
px as state variables
are defined in (3.1). Also, the off-diagonal elements with non-zero values in zp reflect the









































where the diagonal and off-diagonal elements such as Zaa and Zab denote the self-impedances
and mutual impedances between two phases, respectively, shown as Fig. 3.1. Besides, the
mutual impedances between any two phases may not be the same each other due to the
unbalanced nature of the system.
Take the A-phase voltage at node k as an example, the non-zero Jacobian elements of
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Figure 3.1. Three-phase line model in unbalanced distribution systems











































where raϕp denotes the mutual or self-resistance at branch p, p ∈ Ik, and xaϕp denotes the
mutual or self-reactance, ϕ = a, b, c. These phase indices are omitted for simplicity below.
2) PMU current measurements
For the PMU current at branch p,h(x) = hIpr + jhIpx = ipr + jipx, and the only nonzero











1, when p = l
0, elsewhere
where l denotes the index of all branches.
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3) Power measurements including line flows and power injections
For the power injections at node k, the Jacobian elements only has nonzero values of +1
and −1, since the measurement function holds based on Kirchhoff’s current law:
h(x) = hIkr + jhIkx = iin,r + jiin,x −
∑
(iout,r + jiout,x) (3.9)
where iin,r + jiin,x and iout,r + jiout,xas state variables denote the input and output currents
at node k, respectively.
Besides, the Jacobian elements of the equivalent currents at branch p from the corre-
sponding line flows only have nonzero values of +1, similar to PMU current measurements.
3.2.2. Interval Arithmetic and Interval Prediction of DG
An interval number is defined as a compact set [a] = [al, au] = {a ∈ R |al≤a≤au}, and
similarly, an interval vector is defined as a vector with interval elements [26].
When meters are not available at DG locations, effective forecasting techniques are uti-
lized to obtain DG power outputs as pseudo-measurements for achieving system observability
[1]. Due to the difficulty in accurate forecasts for instantaneous wind speeds or solar radia-
tions, their forecast errors inevitably result in considerable forecast errors of DG outputs [46].
Hence, DG outputs in the interval form are modeled to quantify the uncertainty levels in in-
terval predictions, which is more feasible in practice [26]. Conventional pseudo-measurements
originate from the historical or forecast data on generator production and load consump-
tion. Moreover, they obey Gaussian distributions with high-level noises as in [34] or are
represented as other known distribution information as in [28]. In the proposed algorithm,
we relax these assumptions and use the interval prediction of DG outputs. Further, the in-
terval DG outputs are deemed as another form of pseudo-measurements in DSSE to obtain
the interval estimate of states in the subsequent section.
3.3. General ISE Framework and Proposed Algorithm
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3.3.1. ISE Model with Multiple Uncertainties
In this section, an ISE model with multiple uncertainties in DSSE is proposed, where
measurements with noise, uncertain DG outputs, and imprecise line parameters are consid-
ered. The above highly efficient estimator is used to achieve fast monitoring of distribution
networks with these uncertainties.
The impacts of the uncertainty sources on the deterministic estimation model (3.6) are



















where [x] is an interval state vector, and [x]∈Rn×1; [z1] denotes an interval measurement
vector, and [z1]∈Rm1×1 , while [z2] denotes an interval vector of DG power outputs, and
[z2]∈Rm2×1; [H1] and H2 are the Jacobian matrices of the measurements and the DG
outputs, and [H1] ∈ Rm1×n, H2∈Rm2×n; W 1 is the weighted matrix of the measurements,
and W 1∈Rm1×m1 ; I is an identity matrix, and I ∈ Rm2×m2 .
The top-row equation describes the relationship between the measurements and [x]; the
bottom-row equation provides the constraints for the states related to DG outputs. The
uncertain outputs of DG are modeled as pseudo-measurements of the system according to
their interval predictions mentioned in Section 3.2.2. Note that only solving the equation set
at the top row in (3.10) may not obtain the solutions of these state variables. This is owing
to practical engineering concerns that the measurements of DG outputs are not available at
all DG locations. As a result, the top-row system with measurements may be unobservable
by DSSE due to the lack of necessary measurements [33]. The formula (3.10) ensures that
an interval solution not only meets a WLS criterion for all measurements but also follows
the relationship with these interval DG outputs.
According to different uncertainty sources, the details of (3.10) are discussed for clarity.
1) Measurements. Power measurements are converted to equivalent currents by (3.4),
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where U l and I l represent the lower bounds of voltage and current vectors from PMU
measurements, and Ieq,l is the lower bound of equivalent current measurements, while Uu,
Iu, and Ieq,u represent the corresponding upper bounds.
The 3σ deviation criterion about the mean in a Gaussian distribution covers more than
99.7% of the area of the distribution is used to obtain [z1] based on measurements with
noises [34]. For any measurement Zm with a random noise e∼N(0,σ2), Zm ∈ [Z0−3σ,Z0+3σ],
where Z0 represents the true value. Hence, Z0 ∈ [Zm − 3σ, Zm + 3σ], and this measurement
is modeled as an interval enclosing the corresponding true value.
2)DG outputs. The upper and lower bounds of DG outputs as pseudo-measurements
are transformed to equivalent currents by (3.4), respectively. [z2] =[IDG,l, IDG,u], where IDG,l
and IDG,u represent the lower and upper bounds of the equivalent currents. As discussed in
(3.9), the Jacobian matrix H2 related with DG outputs only has nonzero elements of +1 and
−1. Besides, we relax the strong assumption that the statistical information of these DG
outputs is known, i.e., there is no requirement of the knowledge of the mean and covariance
of DG outputs. Such correlations can be translated into respective DG output intervals and
then the proposed method can be still applicable. The detailed consideration of the DG
correlation will be left for our future work.
3) Line Parameters. The uncertainty of line parameters is evaluated in a range based
on their nameplate values [40]. In the adopted estimator, the uncertain line parameters are
only present at the locations corresponding to PMU voltage measurements, i.e., in (3.8) and
in the matrix [H1] of (3.10). Hence, with the line parameter uncertainty, H1 is updated
into an interval matrix [H1] in (3.10).
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3.3.2. General ISE Framework
The impacts of multiple uncertainties on ISE are decoupled in (3.10), and thus an ISE
framework is proposed to deal with different combinations of multiple uncertainties to obtain
the bounds of state variables. The model (3.10) is expressed in a compact form:
[H ]TW [H ] [x] = [H ]TW [z] (3.12)
where [H ] =
 [H1]
H2
, and [H ] ∈ Rm×n;W =
 W 1 0
0 I




, and [z]∈Rm×1; m is the total number of the measurements and DG prediction intervals,
and m = m1 +m2.
In order to avoid computing the interval multiplication in [H ]TW [H ], which is com-
putationally expensive, a dummy interval vector [y] is introduced into (3.12) as suggested
in [47]. Then, an equivalent equation is obtained:









where I is an identity matrix, and I∈Rm×m; [y] ∈ Rm×1.
The formula (3.13) is further expressed below for brevity:
[A] [X] = [B] (3.14)
where [A] =
 [H ] −I
0 [H ]TW
, and [A] ∈ R(m+n)×(m+n); [B] =
 [z]
0




, and [X] ∈ R(m+n)×1.
The model (3.14) is straightforward to realize the mutual transformation between differ-
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ent combinations of uncertainties. This transformation is shown in Fig. 3.2. A general ISE
model considering three types of uncertainties is formulated as (3.14) and named Model IV,
while Model I is a basic ISE model only considering the measurements with noises. When
meters are available at all DG units, with the DG measurements merged into [z1], Model IV








another case, Model IV is simplified into Model II, when parameter identification techniques
or the assumption with accurate line parameters are adopted, i.e., [H1] is fixed as H1.
Figure 3.2. Uncertainties of DSSE in interval arithmetic. The model complexity increases
from Model I to Model IV.
3.3.3. MKO Algorithm for Solving ISE Models
In this section, an MKO algorithm in interval arithmetic is proposed to efficiently solve
the compact ISE model in (3.14). The interval symbols [·] are omitted here for clarity.
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For the interval system AX = B , its solution set in the interval form is expressed as∑
(A,B) = {X̃ : aX̃ = b,∀a ∈ A and ∀b ∈ B}, where X̃, a, and b are the corresponding
deterministic vectors or matrices. Moreover, its interval solution hull X is the interval vector
with the smallest radius containing
∑
(A,B).
A Krawczyk operator is widely employed as a solver for linear interval equations [48].
The core of this operator is to utilize an approximate interval solution X(0) that contains
the final solution hull as an initial value, then gradually approach the final solution hull by
the following iterative process:
X(i+1) =
(
CB + (I −CA)X(i)
)
∩X(i) (3.15)
where C is a preconditioning point matrix, and the inverse of C is the midpoint matrix of
A, expressed as
C−1 = Mid [A] =





Mid [am+n,1] . . . Mid [am+n,m+n]

where Mid [·] is the median function of an interval variable.
It is deduced that with this matrix C that satisfies ‖I −CA‖ < 1, where ‖·‖ is any
subordinate norm, (3.15) converges according to the fixed point theorem [49]. The iterative
process runs until ‖X(i+1) −X(i) ‖∞≤ε, and we set ε = 10−4. Hence, the Krawczyk operator
avoids the issue of interval extension when the tolerance of variables in the iterative process
is sufficiently small, and the interested readers can refer to the proof in [49].
Next, the above Krawczyk operator is modified to improve algorithmic performance in
both accuracy and efficiency. In the proposed MKO algorithm, two computational strategies,
Strategy One and Strategy Two, are jointly used to solve (3.14) quickly and accurately:
1) Strategy One: Start from an initial solution X(0), which is closer to the final solution
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Figure 3.3. Solution hulls of a 2-dimensional interval equation
hull compared to the one that IGE produces.
In the Krawczyk operator, an initial solutionX(0), which meets X̃ ∈X(0) and
∑
(A,B) ⊆
X(0), is required to start the iterative process. A straightforward approach to getting X(0)
is IGE, which is used in [41] as an extension of Gaussian elimination in interval arith-
metic. However, IGE largely expands the widths of interval solutions due to its over-
conservatism [50]. In addition, IGE is expensive to compute since its forward elimination
and back substitution procedure cannot be parallelized.
To address the limitations of IGE, a tighterX(0) is obtained by the following theorem [24].
Theorem 1. If C satisfies ‖I −Ca‖ = β < 1, X̃ = a−1b and ‖·‖ is any subordinate
norm, then
∥∥∥X̃∥∥∥≤‖Cb‖1−β .
Proof. From aX̃ = b, we have X̃ = Cb+ (I −Ca)X̃, and hence
∥∥∥X̃∥∥∥≤‖Cb‖+ ‖I −Ca‖ ∥∥∥X̃∥∥∥→(1− β)∥∥∥X̃∥∥∥≤‖Cb‖
where β < 1 exists for C, which is the inverse of the midpoint matrix of A.
Since ‖Cb‖∞≤ ‖CB‖∞ and ‖I −Ca‖∞≤ ‖I −CA‖∞, an initial vector X(0) is defined
as




1−β and β = ‖I −CA‖∞. ‖·‖∞ is the infinite norm of a vector.
The tighter initial solution in (3.16), which is closer to the final solution hull compared
to the IGE solution, largely improves the efficiency of the iterative process. A schematic
diagram in Fig.3 illustrates the phenomenon, where the accurate solution set of the interval
equation constitutes a star-shaped area [48].
2) Strategy Two: Modify an enclosure of the difference between the solution at the ith
iteration X(i) and an approximate solution, rather than X(i). This modification, combined
with Strategy One, guarantees that the proposed algorithm produces the final solution at
least as tight as the original Krawczyk operator.
First, the approximate solution Xs, which is a point solution located at the center of the
solution space, is calculated by multiplying C by the midpoint vector of B:
Xs = C(Mid [B]) (3.17)
Let d = X −Xs, and get an equivalent interval equation Ad = B − AXs. The initial
solution for this equation is d(0) = X(0) −Xs, where X(0) is calculated by (3.16).




C (B −AXs) + (I −CA)d(i)
)
∩ d(i) (3.18)
until ‖d(i+1) − d(i) ‖∞≤ε.
A final solution is computed by X(i+1) = Xs + d
(i+1). The final solution produced
by (3.18) is at least as tight as the original Krawczyk operator in (3.15), which is verified
through the sub-distributive law for interval arithmetic.
Theorem 2. Sub-distributive Law [50]. For interval variables x, y, and z, the law
holds
x(y + z) ⊆ xy + xz (3.19)
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Apply Theorem 2 to (3.18), and we have







where X(i) = Xs + d
(i).
The formula (3.20) implies thatX(i+1) = Xs+d
(i+1) ⊇ (CB+(I −CA)X(i+1))∩X(i+1),
i.e., the final solution hull provided by the original Krawczyk operator contains the one that
the MKO algorithm solves. Hence, the proposed algorithm obtains a tighter boundary than
the original Krawczyk operator. Moreover, if A and B are thin (an interval with zero radius
is defined as a thin interval), the residual B −AXs is enclosed with fewer rounding errors
than B [24]. These features lead to the higher accuracy and less memory space of the
proposed algorithm, since many thin interval elements exist due to the highly sparse A and
B shown in (3.13), i.e., 0 = [0, 0].
3.4. Simulation Result
The proposed algorithm is tested on unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution
systems [25]. The 13-bus system is modified by adding two single-phase PV units at buses
675 and 684, and a three-phase wind farm at bus 680, shown in Fig. 3.4. The 123-bus system
is modified by adding six DG units, and the installation details of these DG units are listed
in Table 3.1. Based on the weather data [51] shown in Fig. 3.5, at 12:00 am, the wind speed
interval is [8.886, 9.805] m/s, and the solar radiation interval is [191.246, 286.870] W/m2.
The interval outputs of PVs and WTGs are obtained by the method in [26], and constant
power factors are used [15]: [106.72, 149.53] kW for PVs, 0.95 lagging and [84.52, 103.31]
kW for WTGs, 0.85 lagging. For these DGs, the upper and lower bounds of reactive power
are calculated by QDG,u = PDG,utanφ and QDG,l = PDG,ltanφ , where PDG,u and PDG,l are
the upper and lower bounds of power outputs, and φ is the power factor angle.
For simulation purposes, the deterministic DG outputs and constant line parameters that


















Three-phase Branch Two-phase Branch Single-phase Branch  
Figure 3.4. One-line diagram of unbalanced IEEE 13-bus system
Table 3.1. DG placements in 123-bus system
# No. node Type Phase # No.node Type Phase
1 14 PV C 4 250 WTG A, B, C
2 61 WTG A, B, C 5 300 PV A
3 151 WTG A, B, C 6 450 PV A
powers by the power flow program. Measurements are obtained by adding Gaussian noises
to these true values. The following conditions are applied to maximum percentage errors of
hybrid measurements in Table 3.2: 0.7% for magnitudes and 0.7 crad (10−2 rad) for phase
angles in PMU data [52], 2% for active and reactive powers of SCADA data, and 10% for
active and reactive powers at load nodes as pseudo-measurements [37]. Besides, these hybrid
measurements with different sampling rates can be pre-processed for synchronization by the
method in [53]. Note that meters and statistical information of power outputs at some DGs
are not available, e.g., DGs at buses 680 and 675 in the 13-bus system. Conventional DSSE
defines such systems as unobservable, i.e., DSSE fails due to lack of key measurements. In
these cases, the proposed algorithm provides the ranges of state variables with the aid of
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Figure 3.5. DG profiles during one day (a) Wind speed (b) Solar radiation
3.4.1. Result Analysis
The proposed algorithm is tested with Model II on the 13-bus system, provided that
accurate line parameters are known. In this section, we display the voltage magnitude
results of different methods considering that they are more concerned by DSOs in practice,
and these voltage magnitudes are calculated from state variables.
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Table 3.2. Measurement locations in test systems
Measurement Placement Location
Type 13-bus System 123-bus System
SCADA 632-633, 645-646, 684-652
1-7, 9-14, 15-16, 13-52, 18-35,
44-45, 57-60, 76-77, 86-87, 99-100, 110-112
PMU 650, 671 149, 8, 25, 54, 97, 108





     
 
Figure 3.6. Voltage magnitude results of the proposed algorithm
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The estimation results of the proposed algorithm, a linear programming (LP)-based
method, and the IKO method in [41] are compared with true values of voltages, and the
three-phase voltage magnitudes in these methods are intuitively displayed in Fig. 3.6. The
proposed method provides the tight bounds that all possible state variables fall in under
multiple uncertainties, and these ranges contain the true values of voltages. However, the
voltages solved by the LP-based method deviate a lot from the true values at some buses
and even exceed the normal operation voltage range (0.95 ∼ 1.05 p.u.). This is because this
method does not consider the various weights of hybrid measurements in the test system.
Moreover, the sums of these voltage widths between the proposed method and the IGE-
based method are numerically shown in Table 3.3. The widths of voltages for the proposed
algorithm are narrower than the IGE-based method.
3.4.2. Effect of Parameter Uncertainty
The proposed algorithm is applied to two situations in which the line parameters are
determined or in certain ranges, via Model II and Model IV, respectively. To investigate the
influence of uncertain line parameters, two cases are designed:
Case 1 : Constant line parameter vector, P 0.
Case 2 : Line parameters change in [0.95P 0, 1.05P 0].






(xi − xi) (3.21)
Q2 = max(|xi − x̃i| , |x̃i − xi|) (3.22)
where xi and xi are the upper and lower bounds of the ith interval variable, and x̃i denotes
the true value of the ith state variable. Q1 is the average value of interval widths, and Q2 is
the maximum deviation relative to the true values. The interval estimation with smaller Q1
and Q2 has better accuracy.











































































































































































































































































Table 3.3. Detailed comparison in voltage results
Sum of width Proposed Method IKO
[V] Re. Part Im. Part Re. Part Im. Part
Phase A 471.05 260.47 471.08 260.49
Phase B 365.64 214.67 365.65 214.69
Phase C 393.31 215.95 393.34 215.97
ministic DSSE algorithm in [43] without linear approximation runs for 3000 times of MC
trials. In these MC trials, random DG outputs in their predication intervals are regarded as
the inputs to the DSSE method in Case 1, while the random combinations of deterministic
DG outputs and line parameters that fall in the corresponding intervals are used in Case 2.
The minimum and maximum values of these state variables in all MC trials are collected
and compared with the interval estimation results of the proposed algorithm.
Limited by space, the voltage results at the even-numbered nodes of the 123-bus system
are depicted in Fig. 3.7, where the true values of these states are also marked. The interval
results of both methods are shown as similar in the two cases. Concretely, the accuracy
indices Q1 and Q2 in Fig. 3.7(b) are 0.0196 and 0.0163 in the proposed algorithm, while
they are 0.0182 and 0.0171 in MC simulations. These results illustrate that under multiple
uncertainties, the proposed algorithm obtains the tight boundaries of state variables via a
single run, compared with thousands of times of MC runs. Also, the comparison between Fig.
3.7(a) and Fig. 3.7(b) demonstrates that the line parameter uncertainty further intensifies
the variability of state variables. With these imprecise line parameters, the proposed method
provides the ranges that all possible values of states fall in, as a reliable reference to system
operators, shown as Fig. 3.7(b).
3.4.3. Robustness Tests
The robustness of the proposed algorithm is tested on the 123-bus system. Based on
Case 2, three cases are established, where the true values of DG outputs lie on the edge of
interval predictions, i.e., asymmetric intervals. These cases are designed below.
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Table 3.4. Estimation accuracy in robustness tests
Accuracy Indices Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
[p.u.] Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2
Phase A
Re. Part 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.017
Im. Part 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.014
Phase B
Re. Part 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016
Im. Part 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012
Phase C
Re. Part 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.017
Im. Part 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.012
Case 3 : The intervals of PV and WTG outputs are still [106.72, 149.53] kW and [84.52,
103.31] kW. Their true values are fixed at 107 kW and 85 kW in power flow calculation,
respectively, to generate the measurements for ISE.
Case 4 : True values of PV and WTG outputs are 149 kW and 85 kW, respectively.
Other settings are the same as the ones in Case 3.
Case 5 : True values of PV and WTG outputs are 149 kW and 103 kW, respectively.
Other settings are the same as the ones in Case 3.
Table 3.4 summarizes the accuracy indices Q1 and Q2 on three phases in these cases. It
is concluded that these estimation results are not significantly affected by the extent of the
deviation of DG interval predictions relative to their true values. In contrast, the true values
of DG outputs in [37,41] are always assumed in the center of their intervals, which may not
be robust due to the variability of DG outputs.
Table 3.5. Comparison in balanced and unbalanced 123-bus system
Dimensional Analysis Balanced Unbalanced
State Variables:[x] 238× 1 714× 1
Measurements and DG Outputs: [z] 296× 1 888× 1
Augmented Variables: [X] 534× 1 1602× 1
Coefficient Matrix: [A] 534× 534 1602× 1602
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3.4.4. Computational Efficiency
Numerical experiments are carried out to investigate the computational efficiency of the
proposed algorithm. All the tests are performed in MATLAB with the INTLAB toolbox
using a 2.5 GHz, 8 GB of RAM, Intel Core i5 computer.
Table 3.6. CPU time in different cases
CPU time [s]
Case 1 Case 2
13-bus 123-bus 13-bus 123-bus
Proposed Method 0.0099 0.847 0.012 0.965
MC (3000 trials) 89.52 5655.5 89.78 6209.7
LP 2.560 164.68 - -
IKO 8.994 795.57 9.957 911.50
The dimensional analysis towards the ISE model in the balanced and unbalanced 123-bus
systems is given in Table 3.5. The comparison shows that the unbalanced system leads to a
higher-dimensional interval equation. Also, the complexity in unbalanced systems intensifies
low efficiency of the existing methods such as [41], which is proposed in balanced systems.
Further, in both unbalanced systems, the CPU times of the proposed algorithm, MC simu-
lations, the LP-based method, and the IKO method are summarized in Table 3.6. It shows
that the proposed algorithm solves the ISE model in less than one-hundredth amount of
time, compared with other methods.
Table 3.7. Computation time in 123-bus system
CPU Time [s]
Time for Iteration Average Time in
Initial Solution [s] Number Single Iteration [s]
Proposed Method 0.876 2 0.0445
IKO 908.30 8 0.400
Algorithmically, the LP-based method requires solving the equal-scale minimum and
maximum problems for n times, where n is the total number of state variables. It should be
noted that the LP-based method cannot deal with the uncertain line parameters as in Case
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2. Also, as discussed in Section 3.3.3, the initial intervals provided by IGE are much wider
than the final solution hull, and the iterative process of the IKO method is time-consuming.
The comparative analysis between the proposed algorithm and the IKO method is shown in
Table 3.7. It is concluded that the high computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm
firmly holds in the 123-bus unbalanced system.
3.4.5. Results of Model I and Model III
We test the proposed algorithm via Model I and Model III on the 123-bus system, i.e.,
DG outputs can be obtained by meters or pseudo-measurements. Two cases are designed
below.
Table 3.8. Estimation accuracy in robustness tests
Accuracy Indices Case 6 Case 7
[p.u.] Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2
Phase A
Re. Part 0.0135 0.0107 0.0136 0.0124
Im. Part 0.0078 0.0090 0.0080 0.0122
Phase B
Re. Part 0.0116 0.0106 0.0120 0.0121
Im. Part 0.0068 0.0093 0.0070 0.0117
Phase C
Re. Part 0.0138 0.0116 0.0139 0.0133
Im. Part 0.0080 0.0084 0.0081 0.0118
Case 6 : Constant line parameter vector, P 0. Also, the DG outputs are modeled as
pseudo-measurements following known Gaussian distributions, and their maximum errors
are 10% of active and reactive powers [37].
Case 7 : Line parameters change in [0.95P 0, 1.05P 0]. Other settings are the same as the
ones in Case 6.
The indices Q1 and Q2 in both cases are shown in Table 3.8. Besides, we list the compu-
tation time of these cases in Table 3.9. The comparison between these two cases illustrates
that less uncertainty leads to tighter interval results and higher computational efficiency.
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Table 3.9. CPU time in 123-bus system
CPU time [s] Case 6 Case 7
Proposed Method 0.633 0.720




This chapter proposes a novel and fast ISE algorithm with multiple uncertainties in
unbalanced distribution systems. We establish a general ISE framework that simultaneously
considers imprecise line parameters, measurements with noises, and uncertain DG outputs.
An MKO algorithm is proposed to solve these ISE models and obtain the upper and lower
bounds of state variables for better monitoring systems under the coordinated impacts of
these multiple uncertainties. The proposed algorithm is tested on unbalanced 13-bus and
123-bus distribution systems. In contrast to MC simulations and the existing alternatives,
the proposed algorithm encloses tighter boundaries of state variables in a faster manner.
This dissertation will focus on the applications of the proposed DSSE algorithm to bad data
or cyberattack detection in active distribution systems later.
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Chapter 4
Graph-based Faulted Line Identification Using PMU Data in Distribution
Networks
4.1. Introduction
Faults are regarded as an important type of reliability events, which may immensely affect
normal system operation. In the past decade, 22.2 million customers in California experi-
enced about 6000 outage hours resulted from sustained faults [54]. Extensive studies on fault
location are developed in meshed transmission systems (e.g., [55–57]). However, distribution
systems are largely different from transmission systems due to their radial topology and lim-
ited real-time meters. Consequently, these existing fault location methods in transmission
systems cannot be applied to distribution systems. On the other hand, increasingly perva-
sive installation of distribution-level phasor measurement units (PMUs), i.e., micro-PMUs,
improves the system monitoring significantly. Compared with conventional meters, PMUs
provide more accurate measurements of voltage and current phasors at a high resolution.
Several emerging applications of PMUs include distribution system state estimation (DSSE),
fault detection, and faulted line location [58]. For instance, the authors of [59] applied data-
driven techniques with PMU data to detect the presence of a fault in distribution systems;
however, these detection algorithms cannot identify the location of the faulted line.
Quick and accurate location of faults in distribution systems helps the utilities to clear
the faults and accelerate the system restoration; however, this is a challenging task as the
mal-trip or fail-to-trip of the protection devices may lead to inaccurate location of the fault.
The chances of such unfavorable events grow with the bidirectional power flow and the
increasing penetration of distributed generators (DGs). The authors of [60] pointed out that
conventional protection devices such as fault indicators may fail to clear a fault under the
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bidirectional current flow conditions. Also, the overcurrent-based protection devices may not
be able to locate high-impedance faults in distribution systems since it is difficult to identify
the small fault currents [61].
The existing fault location methods are classified into three main types: 1) traveling wave-
based, 2) training-based, and 3) impedance-based. The traveling wave-based algorithms
(e.g., [62, 63]) locate a fault by utilizing the arrival time of the original and reflected waves
generated by the fault. These methods require high-speed communication and high sampling
rate measurements that may not be prevalent in distribution networks. Besides, the training-
based fault location methods, such as artificial neural networks (ANN) [64] and support
vector machine (SVM) [65], require a large number of high-quality measurements as training
datasets and thus suffer from a high computational burden in a training process.
Recent efforts are devoted to proposing impedance-based location methods in distribution
systems [66–70]. For instance, the authors of [67] proposed the fault location methods
focusing on single-phase to ground faults. However, [67] can only localize a faulted area,
rather than yielding an exact faulted line. Emerging works are applying PMU measurements
to fault location by constructing generalized impedance-based location methods [60,68–70].
We conclude that the search strategy in these works is to select each bus or each line as the
candidate fault source and then calculate the values of the self-defined objective function
for each candidate. Then, the fault location is determined by minimizing or maximizing
these function values. Specifically, the authors of [68] used a state estimation technique with
sufficient PMU data to identify the fault at a distribution line. However, these PMUs are
assumed available at each bus, which is impractical due to economic and technical restrictions
in distribution systems. Further efforts are put into fault location with a fewer number of
PMUs, such as [69, 70]. The approach in [70] requires equipping with PMUs at all DGs.
This arrangement may not be practical due to a limited number of available PMUs. Also,
this method does not consider high-impedance faults, which are regarded as an untraceable
fault type in system operation. The authors of [70] defined a fault as a generalized reliability
event and presented an optimization model to locate the event bus by PMU data and pseudo-
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measurements recorded at load/DG buses. Also, due to the presence of local minimums in
the objective function, the method needs to compare all local minimums to obtain a global
one. Further, the global minimum of this function points to the final faulted bus. However,
this process may increase computational complexity due to this traversal search strategy.
Various influence factors, such as fault types, fault impedances, DG penetration, and
measurement errors, may degrade the effectiveness of the existing fault location methods.
To mitigate these impacts, this chapter proposes a graph-based fault location method using
advanced DSSE techniques with PMU data in unbalanced distribution systems. The core of
the proposed method is to determine the faulted line by comparing the weighted measurement
residuals (WMRs) of DSSE in different topologies/graphs. This idea, as a typical application
of state estimation, is proposed in [57, 68], where the power systems are observable by an
adequate number of PMUs. In comparison, the proposed method only requires a limited
number of PMUs in distribution networks for such an application. Specifically, we present
an efficient distributed DSSE algorithm to restrict the search region in a shorter feeder
between two adjacent PMUs. Further, in the shorter feeder, the fault source is identified at
the exact line by applying the DSSE methods to a hierarchical structure. The hierarchical
structure built on the graph theory is presented in Section 4.3 and captures the graphs,
subgraphs, and paths in the network.
4.2. Theoretical Basis
This section describes the theoretical basis for applying DSSE to fault location. We
introduce a classical state estimator and further extend it to an advanced DSSE method
using measurements from a limited number of PMUs.
Developed from this classical estimator, the branch current based DSSE method inte-
grating PMU data is regarded as a computationally efficient method due to its constant
and sparse-structured Jacobian matrix, as reviewed in [14]. Therefore, this section uses the
branch current based DSSE method proposed in [43] for the fault location task. Also, the
voltage at the slack node and branch currents are chosen as state variables, and we express
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1x, · · · , icLx
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(4.1)
where vϕslack,r and v
ϕ
slack,x denote the real and imaginary parts of the ϕ -phase slack node’s
voltage, and ϕ ∈ {a, b, c}; iϕlr and i
ϕ
lx denote the real and imaginary parts of the branch
current at branch l, l = 1, . . . , L, and L is the number of branches. In the following, the
phase index ϕ is suppressed for simplicity.
Here, the measurement vector includes the PMUs’ recorded magnitudes and phase angles
of voltages and currents as well as power measurements from pseudo-measurements, and
the latter provides the historical or forecasting data with a low-level accuracy of power
consumption/production at loads/DGs [70]. We list the measurement functions for voltages,
currents, and powers in this estimator as follows:

hVkr(x) = zj = zVkr , k ∈ ψV
hVkx(x) = zj = zVkx , k ∈ ψV
(4.2)

hIpr(x) = zj = zIpr , p ∈ ψI
hIpx(x) = zj = zIpx , p ∈ ψI
(4.3)

hPk(x) = zj = zPk , k ∈ ψS
hQk(x) = zj = zQk , k ∈ ψS
(4.4)
where zj denotes measurement j and is expressed as 1) the real and imaginary parts of
voltages, zVkr and zVkx , 2) the real and imaginary parts of currents, zIpr and zIpx , or 3)
the real and reactive powers, zPk and zQk ; hVkr(x), hVkx(x), hIpr(x), hIpx(x), hPk(x), and
hQk(x) denote the corresponding measurement functions; ψV and ψI are the sets of nodes and
branches with voltage/current measurements from limited PMUs installed in the distribution
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system, and ψS is the set of load/DG nodes; k and p are the indices of nodes and branches,
respectively.
For k ∈ ψS, the pseudo-measurements at node k are further converted into equivalent










where zeqIkr and z
eq
Ikx
are the real and imaginary parts of the equivalent injection current at node
k; Vk as the voltage phasor at the node is updated during the DSSE procedure, since the
PMU measurement of Vk is not available at each node; [·]∗ denotes the complex conjugate.
By the processing in (4.5), the Jacobian matrix is independent of xt, i.e.,H(xt) = H [43].
The measurement functions of (4.2), (4.3), (4.5), and Jacobian elements of H are listed
below.
1) Voltages
The voltage measurement function of the PMU at node k ∈ ψV is expressed as:
hVkr + jhVkx = vslack −
∑
p∈Ik
(Rp + jXp)ip (4.6)
where Ik denotes a set of line segments from the slack node to node k, and p ∈ Ik. Rp
and Xp denote the 3×3 resistance and reactance matrices of branch p. Also, the complex
variables ip= ipr + jipx and vslack= vslack, r + jvslack,x are the voltage phasor at the slack node



























The current measurement function of the PMU at branch p ∈ ψI is shown as
hIpr + jhIpx = ipr + jipx (4.7)
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where ipr and ipx denote the real and imaginary parts of the current states, and thus the

















1, when p = l
0, elsewhere
where l denotes the branch index, and l = 1, . . . , L.
3) Power Injections
The power measurements presenting at node k ∈ ψS are converted into equivalent current










(ilr + jilx) (4.8)
where ilr and ilx as state variables denote the real and imaginary inflow and outflowing
currents at node k , and Λ′k and Λk denote the set of branches with the inflow and outflow
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1, when l ∈ Λ′k
−1, when l ∈ Λk
0, elsewhere
The complete DSSE procedure can be found in [43], and the next section gives the details
of the modified DSSE method for faulted line identification.
4.3. Graph-Based Faulted Line Identification Method
This section proposes a graph-based fault location method that leverages the above DSSE
method to narrow down the searching area and then locate the faulted line.
We consider a distribution network as a graph G(V , E), where V and E denote the sets of
vertices (nodes) and the edges (branches), respectively. A PMU is installed at the substation,
and other PMUs are installed at a limited number of nodes along the feeder. Each of
these PMUs measures the nodal voltage and the currents on the branches connected to that
node [43]. We define a subgraph GK(VK , EK) as the subset of G(V , E) that connects two
adjacent PMUs, PMUs K and K + 1, where K = 1, . . . ,M − 1 and M≥2. Here, M is
the number of PMUs installed in the network. Fig.4.1 shows the schematic diagram of the
subgraphs. In the figure, G1 is a subgraph that includes the branches and nodes between
PMUs 1 and 2, while G2 contains those between PMUs 2 and 3.
We briefly describe the proposed fault location method:
1. Step One: Using a distributed DSSE algorithm, the searching area for the fault is
restricted to the feeder between two adjacent PMUs, i.e., a certain subgraph.
2. Step Two: The location of the fault is further identified as the faulted line.
4.3.1. Step One: Identifying the Faulted Subgraph
This step proposes an efficient DSSE algorithm in GK to identify the subgraph that con-
tains the faulted line, i.e., the faulted subgraph. By the graph partition and the subsequent
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 Figure 4.1. A sample of radial distribution networks with three PMUs. The dotted lines
with arrows at nodes denote the laterals (if present)
network equivalence, the DSSE method leverages the PMU and pseudo-measurement data in
GK and runs in parallel for these subgraphs with shorter feeders, i.e., distributed DSSE [71].
1) Network Equivalence
In each subgraph, we suppose that the vertex of GK acts as the root node of this subgraph.
The lateral connected to PMU K+1 is also included in GK , while the lateral at the root
node of GK is included in the last subgraph, i.e., GK−1. Fig. 4.2 shows the schematic
diagram of GK in this design. At node k ∈ VK , one type of the following measurements
exist and VK = VK1 + VK2 + VK3: 1) Only PMU data (i.e., the measurements of PMU K
at the root node), and let k ∈ VK1; 2) PMU data (i.e., measurements of PMU K + 1) and
pseudo-measurements, and k ∈ VK2; 3) Only pseudo-measurements, and k ∈ VK3.
To reduce the impact of the graph partition on the power flow in the original network
shown as Fig. 4.2(a), we do the equivalent current calculation at node k ∈ VK2. Specifically,
the real and imaginary parts of the injected current at node k in GK , z
sub
Ikr





= (zeqIkr + jz
eq
Ikx
) + (zIkr + jzIkx) (4.9)
where zeqIkr and z
eq
Ikx
denote the real and imaginary parts of the injection currents of pseudo-
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measurements obtained by (4.5), and zIkr and zIkx are the real and imaginary parts of the
current to the downstream network measured by PMU K + 1, shown in Fig. 4.2(b). For
simplicity, (4.9) does not show the measurement noises.
At node k ∈ VK1∪VK3, the measurement functions (4.5) – (4.8) hold.
2) Identification Metric
We use the WMR in DSSE as the metric to determine the faulted subgraph. In normal
operation, assume measurement noises follow Gaussian distribution, WMRs obey a Chi-
square distribution with at most m − n degrees of freedom [19]. With a limited number
of PMUs installed in distribution systems, the degree of freedom is low and equal to the
number of these PMUs. Therefore, the values of a WMR in each subgraph fluctuate within
a limited range under the impact of measurement noises, when no faults occur.
On the other hand, according to [57], a fault introduces an additional unknown fault
current IF injected to the ground or other phases, while the DSSE equations are built on
the precondition IF = 0. If a fault occurs in GK , the presence of the fault violates the
state estimation relationship and leads to a high WMR in the faulted subgraph; The DSSE
in normal subgraphs have low WMRs even under the impact of measurement noises [68].
Hence, the faulted subgraph is determined by selecting the maximum of WMRs:
K∗ = arg max
K
JK K = 1, . . . ,M − 1 (4.10)
where JK denotes the WMR in subgraph K calculated by (2.2).
Based on the state estimator presented in (2.1) – (2.5), we conclude the procedure for
identifying the faulted subgraph below:
1) Considering GK(VK , EK), the measurements in each subgraph are collected to form
the Jacobian and weight matrices, i.e., HK and WK .
2) For K = 1, . . . ,M − 1, the DSSE process in subgraph K is shown in the following
steps:





μPMU K μPMU K+1
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Figure 4.2. Subgraph K (a) Embedded in the whole feeder (b) Decoupled with other sub-
graphs. The reference directions of branch currents measured by two PMUs are shown.



















+ (zIkr + jzIkx) (4.12)
where (4.11) is used for k ∈ VK3, and (4.12) holds at k ∈ VK2; Vroot comes from the voltage
measurement from the PMU at the root node.
Then, obtain the initial branch currents x0 by a backward sweep method. Use x0 and
Vroot to calculate initial nodal voltages Vk by a forward sweep method.
b. Obtain h(x) using (4.6) – (4.8), and calculate ∆xt and update the new state variables
by xt+1 = xt+ ∆xt. Calculate the latest voltages Vk based on the new states by the forward
sweep.
c. If ∆xt is less than a pre-set tolerance or t reaches the maximum iteration number,
yield JK using (4.1) as the WMR of GK ; otherwise, use the latest Vk to calculate injection
currents by (4.5) or (4.9), then go to step b.
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3) Procure the faulted subgraph K∗ using (4.10).
Finding the faulted subgraph at this stage reduces the computation burden associated
with locating the faulted line in subgraphs without faults.
4.3.2. Step Two: Locating the Faulted Line
Once we obtain the faulted subgraph GK∗ by Step One, a similar WMR metric based on
the DSSE technique is developed to identify the exact line that a fault lies at. Also, we use
the following definitions to present Step Two in GK∗ .
Definition 1 (Paths in a subgraph). A path in a subgraph is a set of interconnected
edges that begins with the root node of the subgraph. A path that a fault is located in is a
corrupted path.
Definition 2 (Adjacent Paths and Boundary Edge). Two paths denoted by Ps−1
and Ps, s = 1,. . . , S, are defined as adjacent paths, and if Ps−1 ⊆ Ps and Ps = Ps−1 ∪ {ε},
where ε is the boundary edge that connects two vertices ν and µ, ν ∈ Ps−1 and µ ∈ Ps.
All paths in a faulted subgraph share a starting vertex (root), and different paths are
formed by radially expanding the topology of GK∗ . The paths Ps in each subgraph are
sorted by their depth. The shortest path in the subgraph K∗ only includes one edge, while
the longest path is the whole subgraph GK∗ .
In theory, the WMRs in two neighboring paths without fault current injections should
be close to each other; the WMR of DSSE in a path is low if there is no fault in the path,
while WMR is significantly high once faults occur in the path. Therefore, we convert the
fault location problem into a problem of searching for the corrupted path that includes the
fault, and this corrupted path is characterized by abnormally high WMR in DSSE. To find
the corrupted path, DSSE runs for each path in GK∗ , and the sending-end branch currents
in the corresponding path are chosen as state variables shown in Fig. 4.3. We apply the
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DSSE algorithm in Step One for path s and calculate the WMR by
WMRs = [zs − hs(x)]TW s[zs − hs(x)] (4.13)
where zs and hs (x) denote the measurement vector and measurement functions for path s,
and s = 1,. . . , S; W s denotes the diagonal weight matrix for this path.
According to Definition 2, if a fault occurs at the boundary edge ε, we have
WMRs  WMRs−1 (4.14)
where WMRs and WMRs−1 are the WMRs in paths Ps−1 and Ps calculated by (4.1),
respectively. To find the faulted boundary edge, set the user-defined identification thresholds





where ε denotes the identification threshold for evaluating the abnormally high WMR.
We consider that various fault conditions may occur, and they are unpredictable for
system operators. As a result, although a proper identification threshold is beneficial for fault
location, the specific value of this threshold is difficult to determine when the fault location,
fault impedance, and fault type are unknown. Similar to [55] and [73], the identification
threshold ε could be properly selected by using historical or simulation data of different
faults to enforce (4.15). Also, it is efficient to run the efficient DSSE method for verifying
the relationship in (4.15), since the Jacobian matrix Hs for path s is sparse and independent
of state variables.
Illustrative Example: To clarify the procedure of the proposed method, let us consider
a 5-node subgraph shown in Fig. 4.3, where l= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and a lateral is connected to























Figure 4.3. Sample network of a 5-node subgraph, and a lateral is connected to node 3
shown as a dotted line. (a) A fault occurs at branch 3-5. (b) A fault occurs at branch 3-4.
Table 4.1. State variables and measurements in a 5-node subgraph
s Ps State Variables x Measurements zs
1 1-2 i1, i2 zV1 , zi1 , z
eq
i2
2 1-3 i1, i2, i3, i4 zV1 , zi1 , z
eq
i2
, zeqi3 , z
eq
i4
3 1-5 i1, i2, i3, i4, i5 zV1 , zI1 , zi2 , z
eq
i2
, zeqi3 , z
eq
i4
branches from node 1 to node 3, including the lateral 3-4. Table 4.1 lists the state variables
and measurements used in these paths, and we show Hs for path s = 1, 2, and 3, which
are marked by three block matrices, respectively. In Fig. 4.3(a), the fault is located at the
boundary edge between paths 2 and 3 by the proposed method, i.e., branch 3-5; the source
of the fault in Fig. 4.3(b) is located at the boundary edges between paths 1 and 2, i.e.,
branches 2-3 and 3-4, and there are two boundary edges due to the existence of a lateral. In
the case that a fault occurs at a lateral as Fig. 4.3(b), the fault source could be located at
the lateral or the only upstream branch connected to it, even when there is no PMU installed
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at the lateral. Granting complete observability on laterals may not be of economic interest,
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We summarize the proposed algorithm in the pseudo-code. Owing to the hierarchical
graph-subgraph-path structure in the proposed method and the adaptation of the advanced
DSSE method, the search along the faulted subgraph is more efficient, compared with the
ones considering the whole distribution feeder.
4.3.3. PMU Placement
The identification accuracy of the proposed method relies on the number and locations of
PMUs. As the number of PMUs increases, the size of a partitioned graph in the distribution
network will be smaller. This would increase the measurement redundancy defined as the
ratio of the number of measurements to that of states. The minimum number of PMUs to be
installed in a distribution feeder is two. Moreover, with more PMUs installed, the location
performance and computational efficiency of the proposed method can be improved.
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Algorithm 1 Graph-based Faulted Line Identification Algorithm
1: Input: System model and measurement data.
2: While: The presence of a fault is detected, and its location is unknown.
3: Step One:
Run the distributed DSSE algorithm for GK in parallel, and obtain GK∗ by (4.10).
4: Step Two:
Let s = 1, and obtain zs and hs(x). Then, calculate WMRs by (4.13)
5: if WMRs > ε then
The faulted line is identified as the first branch in GK∗ .
6: else
7: for s = 2 to S do
8: if WMRs−1 ≤ ε and WMRs > ε then




13: Output: the faulted line.
To guarantee the observability for faulted lines, the following conditions presented in
earlier research about meter placement are considered:
1) PMU measurements are available at a substation and nodes in the main feeders that
have many downstream nodes. Such design is suggested in [71] and [72] to provide improved
observability with a limited number of PMU measurements.
2) PMUs can be installed at the ends of feeders or long laterals to ensure the observability
and identify the faulted lateral if necessary [69,70].
To maximize the location accuracy using a certain number of PMUs, an optimal PMU
placement method presented in [74] can be implemented by considering the probability of
various fault types’ occurrence. However, the optimal meter placement is a complicated
multi-objective optimization problem, involving multiple impact factors, such as the in-
stallation cost, estimation accuracy, and faulted line observability, etc. We adopt a meter
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placement scheme with a low measurement redundancy following the above-mentioned con-
ditions, which illustrates the potential of the proposed method for faulted line identification
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Figure 4.4. Single-line diagram for the three-phase 34-node test feeder
4.4. Case Study
We test the proposed algorithm on a three-phase unbalanced 24.9kV, IEEE 34-node
test feeder. The test system is modified by adding three DGs (two synchronous generators
and one PV [69]) into the original systems and simulated in PSCAD, and the proposed
location method runs in MATLAB. The detailed models of these DGs can be found in [75].
Fig. 4.4 shows the PMU and DG placement in the system, where five PMUs are installed
and the nameplate capacity of DGs is 500kVA. The procedure adopted by PMUs to obtain
voltage or current phasor measurements is described in Appendix A. Illustrated as Table
4.2, the propose graph partition in Section 4.3 divides the system into four subgraphs, i.e.,
GK ⊆ G and K = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Assume that measurement noises obey Gaussian distributions. Moreover, the maximum
errors of magnitudes and phase angles for PMU data are 1% of the true values and 0.01 rads,
respectively, while the maximum errors for the powers recorded by pseudo-measurements at
load/DG nodes are 20% of the true values. Also, smart meters can be installed at DGs
for accurately monitoring power outputs, and the maximum errors of these outputs are 3%.
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Table 4.2. Measurement information of subgraphs
Subgraph GK PMU K PMU K + 1 Nodes in GK
G1 1 2 1-12
G2 2 3 9-18
G3 3 4 17-29
G4 3 4 25-34
By collecting measurements at the DG nodes, distribution system operators (DSOs) do not
require the specific DG models. Moreover, DG operators may not share these detailed models
and control policies with DSOs due to a lack of agreements between them. However, DSOs
can still monitor their power dispatch by the measurement data [75].
4.4.1. Faulted-subgraph Identification
This section shows the identification performance of the proposed method in Step One for
faulted subgraphs. We test the proposed algorithm with single-phase LG faults, which are
set at three branches in each subgraph, e.g., branches 3-4, 7-8, and 10-11 in G1. Moreover,
these faults are placed at the beginning (0.25Ll), in the middle (0.5Ll), and at the end
(0.75Ll) of the lines, and Ll denotes the corresponding line length. In each fault location,
fifty sets of measurements are generated by Monte Carlo simulations. Also, considering nine
fault locations for each subgraph, 9×50=450 fault scenarios for two influence factors (fault
locations and measurement noises) in each subgraph are tested. In all tests, the subgraphs
with the highest values of the identification function JK correctly point to those faulted
subgraphs. The values of JK across K = 1, 2, 3, 4 for these faults are shown in Fig. 4.5,
where we average the WMRs of each subgraph for conciseness. As discussed in Section ó,
WMR greatly increases in the faulted subgraph, indicating that the fault is located at that
subgraph. For example, when a fault occurs in G1, J1 is abnormally higher than J2, J3, and
J4. This leads to an immediate conclusion that the fault is located in G1.
Furthermore, we test the two-phase line-to-line faults with 50 Ω fault impedance in GK ,










Figure 4.5. Identification results in different faulted subgraphs, where we set LG faults on
phase A with 100 Ω impedance in GK .
indicates the location of the faulted subgraph. Also, the identification performance for the
faulted subgraph is not influenced by fault types and fault impedances.
4.4.2. Faulted-line Location
We test various fault scenarios to evaluate the location performance of the proposed
method. Fig.4.7 shows the WMRs for different paths in the faulted subgraph for LL faults
on phases B and C on branch 3-4 in G1, where we run 100 Monte Carlo simulations for
random combinations of measurement noises. In this figure, the WMRs of the normal paths
are much lower than those for the corrupted paths. Also, with the radial expansion of
paths, the WMRs of the corrupted path that the boundary edge 3-4 lies in have high values.
Consequently, branch 3-4 is identified as the faulted line.
We further evaluate the location accuracy of the proposed method by calculating the











Figure 4.6. Identification results in different faulted subgraphs. LL faults on phases B and










Figure 4.7. Location results in G1, when LL faults with 10Ω fault impedance occur at
branch 3-4. The secondary y-axis shows the WMRs at the corrupted path in 100 Monte
Carlo simulations.
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Table 4.3. Performance with different fault types (50 Ω impedance)
Fault Type α β 1− α− β Max Error
G1 94.50% 4.67% 0.83% 2 branches
G2 95.75% 4.25% 0% 1 branch
G3 96.83% 3.17% 0% 1 branch
G4 95.67% 4.33% 0% 1 branch
immediate neighboring branch of the faulted branch is determined as a faulted one [70]:
α = N0/Nt (4.16)
β = N1/Nt (4.17)
where N0 and N1 denote the number of the tests in these two cases, respectively, and Nt is
the total number of the tests; also, 1 − α − β is used to calculate the probability of other
results, i.e., other branches are determined as a faulted line.
We calculate these accuracy indices α and β in scenarios with various fault types and
fault impedances, where Nt = 1200 is set to obtain statistical results in each scenario, and
here the identification threshold ε = 500.
1) Fault Type
The impacts of various fault types on the location accuracy of the proposed algorithm
are investigated. Four fault types denoted as LG, LL, LLG, and LLL, are tested. We list
the location results of these fault types in Table 4.3. It is shown that the proposed method
enables correct faulted line location with various fault types and reaches 94% and higher
accuracy.
2) Fault Impedance
We test the impacts of fault impedances on the accuracy of the proposed algorithm. We
set different fault impedances at each branch of G2, and Table 4.4 shows the accuracies of
this method to locate faults with these impedances. Especially, the proposed method enables
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accurate locations of bolted faults, owing to the existence of the fault injection currents with
high magnitudes. The results in Table 4.4 show that the proposed method enables correct
fault-line location with multiple fault impedances.
Table 4.4. Performance with different fault impedances (LL faults)
Fault Type α β Max Error
0Ω 100% 0% 0 branches
10Ω 94.67% 5.33% 1 branch
50Ω 94.83% 5.17% 1 branch
100Ω 100% 0% 0 branch
200Ω 95.08% 4.92% 1 branch
The proposed method is tested with high-impedance LG faults (100, 200, 500, 800, and
1000 Ω) at branch 3-4 to show the sensitivity towards magnitudes of fault currents. Fig.4.8
shows the probabilities of the correct location of the faulted branch, where Monte Carlo
simulations with 400 samples of measurements are used. The location probabilities are higher
than 88% under these various current injections. The reason is that the measurement errors
of voltages and currents are proportional to the measurement values, while the measurement
weights are inversely proportional to them. While smaller fault current injections occur, as
the weights of measurements are higher in this case, the WMR will be high. We conclude
that the proposed method works effectively when the fault impedance is not higher than
1000 Ω in the test system. Once the fault impedance exceeds about 2000 Ω, the proposed
approach may not observe the small fault injection at long branches in the 34-node system.
4.4.3. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
We investigate the robustness and sensitivity of the proposed method against various
measurement noises and identification thresholds.
1) Measurement Errors
We conduct robustness analysis concerning higher measurement noises. We set the mea-











































Figure 4.8. Performance for high-impedance LG faults at branch 3-4.
ing the maximum errors of pseudo-measurements as 10%, 30%, and 50%. Table 4.5 lists the
accuracy of the proposed algorithm with these measurement noises. As shown, even with
high pseudo-measurement errors up to 50%, either the correct line or its immediately neigh-
boring line is identified. It implies that such high-level noises do not degrade the location
performance since DSSE takes the weights of measurement noises into full account. Also,
the location performance of this algorithm is robust against measurement errors.
Table 4.5. Performance with higher measurement errors (LG, 50 Ω impedance)
Max Error of PMU Data Max Error of Pseudo-meas. α Max Error
2%, 0.02 rad
10% 94.67% 1 branch
30% 94.50% 1 branch
50% 94.42% 1 branch
2) Identification Threshold
We test the location performance of the proposed method with various identification
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thresholds ε. Fig. 4.7 shows that the WMRs in the corrupted paths are much higher than
those for the normal paths. Further, different thresholds are set in the cases of Section 4.4.2,
and the location accuracy with these thresholds is calculated and listed in Table 4.6. We
conclude that the identification threshold could be properly selected to maintain a desirable
identification sensitivity.
Table 4.6. Impact of identification thresholds
Threshold ε α β 1− α− β Max Error
100 88.69% 10.35% 0.96% 2 branches
500 95.92% 3.91% 0.17% 2 branches
1000 97.08% 2.92% 0% 1 branch
2000 97.25% 2.75% 0% 1 branch
4.4.4. Impact of Line Parameters
Line parameters in distribution systems are subject to changes with environmental con-
ditions. Considering this uncertainty, the range of line parameters is generally set within
±5% of their nominal values [20]. Therefore, we consider the variation in line parameters to
evaluate the accuracy of the proposed method.
Table 4.7. Location accuracy with uncertainty in line parameters
Maximum Errors of Line Parameters α β Max Error
2% 100% 0% 0 branch
5% 97.5% 2.5% 1 branch
10% 95.5% 3.25% 2 branches
We use Monte Carlo simulations to generate 400 test scenarios, where imprecise line
parameters are assumed to obey Gaussian distribution with various maximum deviations
and zero means. Table 4.7 lists the location accuracy of the proposed algorithm, and the
maximum errors are 2%, 5%, and 10% of true values of line parameters. Also, LG faults
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with 100 Ω are set on different branches in G2. With 5% deviation in the line parameters,
either the correct faulted line or its immediate neighboring branch is identified.
We conclude that inaccurate line parameters degrade the location accuracy of the pro-
posed method, and hence line calibration in power systems is necessary periodically.
4.4.5. Computational Efficiency
Numerical experiments for different faults are performed to demonstrate the computa-
tional efficiency of the proposed algorithm. We run this method on a PC with 2.6 GHz i5,
and 8GB RAM using MATLAB 2017b.
Table 4.8. CPU time in test system





Table 4.8 lists the average CPU time of the proposed method, including two steps, for
faulted line identification in these test systems. It shows that once the measurement data are
collected, this algorithm locates the faults within 15 milliseconds in the 34-node distribution
system. Compared to the traversal search strategy for a whole feeder, the proposed method
runs in parallel for feeders with a reduced size, which improves the computational efficiency
for application to the larger-scale networks. It should be noted that owing to the increase
in the number of nodes in subgraphs of this larger-scale system, the proposed method takes
a longer CPU time, i.e., about 20 ms, for faulted line identification. With more PMUs
installed, the number of nodes in a subgraph decrease, and the computational efficiency of
this method can be further improved.
4.5. Conclusion
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This chapter proposes a graph-based faulted line identification algorithm using PMU data
in distribution systems. We present a distributed DSSE algorithm to identify the faulted
subgraph efficiently, and this method significantly reduces the searching scale and speeds up
the subsequent fault location procedure. Further, we conveniently determine a faulted line by
applying a hierarchical graph-subgraph-path structure to the DSSE method. The proposed
method is suitable for radial distribution systems and can be updated by incorporating
the linear measurement functions proposed in [42] for weakly meshed distribution systems.
In the case of inadequate PMU and DGs installed at the distribution level, the proposed
method enables accurate faulted-line location. Extensive simulations verify the accuracy and
efficiency of this method under various fault scenarios.
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Chapter 5
Semi-supervised Deep Learning for False Data Injection Attack Detection
5.1. Introduction
Power distribution systems are transforming into smart grids with the development of
advanced communicating devices, such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) and smart
meters, which facilitate the system monitoring and control. However, the high dependence on
information technology also increases vulnerability from malicious cyber-attacks [76]. Among
common attacks in cyber-physical systems, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are regarded
as one of the most challenging threats against secure system operation. An unobservable
FDIA can circumvent the conventional bad data detection (BDD) mechanism based on
measurement residuals of state estimation [8]. Without the aids of the effective detection
mechanism, attackers can stealthily launch the FDIA multiple times, which degrades the
performance of the state estimation algorithm and may render a significant threat to the
grids [30].
Some research on FDIA construction is reported in different application scenarios in
DC power systems, while recent work in AC transmission systems emerges due to their
reactively accurate analytical models [77, 78]. Liang et al. [79] conducted a comprehensive
survey on construction methods for FDIAs. On the other hand, many results using various
statistical and probabilistic techniques are reported to defend against FDIA in DC system
state estimation, such as sparse optimization [80] and Kalman filter [81]. However, these
methods require information on measurement data distributions and system operation states,
and once these perquisites change, detection for FDIAs may become ineffective and outdated.
Recently, with the fast development of advanced metering infrastructure that collects
a massive volume of data, machine-learning and data-driven techniques are being widely
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applied to power system operation because of their powerful capability of extracting useful
information and flexible extensibility [82]. Also, various learning-based techniques for detect-
ing FDIAs in transmission systems have emerged, including deep belief networks (DBN) [83],
support vector machines (SVM) [84,85], and deep neural networks (DNN) [86]. For instance,
He et al. [83] proposed a conditional DBN-based method with a restricted Boltzmann ma-
chine for detecting compromised data in DC power systems. The authors of [84] proposed
a semi-supervised learning approach based on mixture Gaussian distribution and SVM for
detecting FDIAs against state estimation in DC transmission systems, and since a linear sys-
tem model is used to generate the measurement data, principal component analysis (PCA) is
used for extracting the data feature. However, real-world utilities widely employ AC power
system models, and these algorithms, such as [80, 83–85], performed on DC power systems,
ignore the complexity of power systems or the sophistication of unobservable attacks by the
conventional BDD mechanism. To overcome this deficiency when dealing with unobservable
attacks in AC transmission systems, [86] uses wavelet transform and DNN techniques to
capture the inconsistency of abnormal and normal measurements by analyzing the state dy-
namics. Nevertheless, the method in [86] requires measurements with labels from continuous
samplings that may be unavailable in practical operation and leads to a high computational
burden. Note that most existing machine-learning algorithms for detecting FDIAs such
as [83] and [86] are supervised and test the abnormal data that differ in some manner from
the labeled data available during training. However, the datasets collected from practical
cyber-physical systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs [87]. Moreover,
the scale of unlabeled data is usually much larger than that of the labeled data in practice,
and these extensive unlabeled data seldom take part in the supervised learning process. This
absence leads to the loss of useful information, even the failure in this process.
In contrast to the work in transmission systems, there is a handful of research related
to FDIAs at the distribution level, although the vulnerability of distribution systems has
been discovered over the years [79]. For instance, Dai et al. [88] presented two simple
yet powerful cyber-attack methods targeting feeder automation and introduced a search
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theory-based method for modeling the probability of feeders being attacked. Deng et al.
[89] proposed an FDIA model with limited knowledge of system states, which exposes the
feasibility of attacks without being detected by the current BDD mechanism. Then, they
extended this work focusing on balanced networks to unbalanced distribution systems in [44];
these systems are more consistent with practical models. Motivated by these studies on
constructing unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems, reliable system operation demands
countermeasures against these FDIAs urgently.
This chapter proposes an adversarial autoencoder (AAE)-based detection algorithm for
unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. Considering the high dimensionality and non-
linear correlated nature of measurements, we apply autoencoders to dimension reduction
and feature extraction of measurement datasets in the three-phase unbalanced networks.
Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial networks
(GAN) framework [90], which successfully detects abnormal measurements under FDIAs by
capturing the unconformity between anomalies and secure measurements. Also, because of
the expensive labeling costs and potential missing labeled data in practical systems, this
method only requires unlabeled data and a few labeled data from measuring instruments by
leveraging the powerful generation capability of GAN and thus is semi-supervised learning.
5.2. State Estimation and FDIA
5.2.1. BDD based on Estimation Residuals
Section 2.2.1 introduces classical state estimation theory [10]. The relationship between
redundant measurements and state variables is depicted as:
z = h(x) + e (5.1)
where x is an n-dimension state vector, and z is an m-dimension measurement vector;
h(x) is the measurement function about x; the measurement noise vector e obeys a Gaus-
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sian distribution e ∼ N(0,R) is a covariance matrix and is usually considered diago-
nal, R = diag [σ21, σ
2




i denotes the variance of the ith measurement error,
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The state variables are obtained via a WLS criterion that minimizes the sum of weighted
measurement residuals J as:
x̂ = arg min J = arg min[z − h(x)]TW [z − h(x)] (5.2)
where W is a weight matrix of measurements to quantify the trust levels of diverse mea-
surements, and W = R−1.
In three-phase unbalanced distribution systems, the system states are chosen as the
voltage phasors at all buses and expressed as
x = [va1, v
b
1, · · · , vcn] (5.3)
where vϕj denotes the ϕ-phase voltage phasor at bus j, ϕ = {a, b, c} and j = 1, 2, . . . , n; n
is the number of the buses in the system.
The measurement vector z in DSSE generally includes 1) voltage and current phasors
from distribution-level PMUs, 2) power flows recorded by supervisory control and data acqui-
sition systems, and 3) power injections from smart meters or pseudo-measurements, including
load consumption and DG [20]. The detailed formulation of the measurement functions h (x)
can be found in Section 2.2.2. The DSSE model is nonlinear since PMUs are not installed
at each node in a practical distribution system [10]. Then, the solution of the DSSE model
is solved iteratively based on the Newton-Gauss process (2.3)-(2.5).
Considering the sampling errors of various measuring instruments and potential malicious
cyberattacks, the conventional BDD mechanism of state estimation applies the LNR test
[79]. The LNR test calculates the measurement residual r and the normalized measurement
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where r = z−h(x̂); S represents the measurement sensitivity matrix of this estimator, and
S = I −H(HTWH)−1HTW .
The LNR test is used to detect the presence of bad data due to malicious cyber-attacks,








where rNi denotes the ith element of r
N , and i = 1, 2, . . . , M ; H0 and H1 represent the
hypotheses without and with bad data or false data injection, respectively, and the threshold
λ is set to some predetermined significant level.
5.2.2. On the Existence of Linear Approximation of DSSE
The power flow equations already contain the linear relationships (2.7) and (2.8) between
x and PMU measurements, together with nonlinear relationships between x and power
measurements. The authors of [91] proposed linear approximation theorems and the error
analysis to establish a linear model between the voltages and powers. Based on [91], [44]
proposes an FDIA construction model in the distribution system.
In [91], the complex power measurements at node k or at branch i-j can be converted to
the equivalent currents as
Ik eq = (Sk/V slack)
∗ (5.6)
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I ij eq = (Sij/V slack)
∗ (5.7)
where V slack denotes the voltage at the substation.
The DSSE model with this approximation is expressed as
z = [V k, I ij, Ik eq, I ij eq]
T = [I,Y br,Y bus,Y br eq]
Tx+ e (5.8)
where the Jacobian matrix H = [I,Y br,Y bus,Y br eq]
T and I denotes the identity matrix;
Y br is a matrix composed of all the Y ij at {i, j} ∈ ψI and zero elements, Y bus (or Y br eq) is
a matrix composed of all the Y k (or Y ij) at k ∈ ψS (or {i, j} ∈ ψS) and zero elements.
This linear approximation solution is closer to the nonlinear solution provided by (2.11),
compared with a linear solution by simplifying the AC distribution system as a DC model.
The conclusion is validated by the case study in [44,91]. Based on this linear approximation,
an unobservable FDIA in three-phase distribution systems can be constructed by the method
presented in the next section.
5.2.3. Unobservable FDIA
The objective of FDIAs is to mislead system operators to consider xa = x + c as the
estimated state vector, where c is the deviation of normal system states x [8]. The attackers
can manipulate the received measurements at a control center into za = z + a, and a is an
injected attack vector. Also, the measurement residual vector of za is expressed as
ra = za − h(x+ c) = z + a− h(x+ c). (5.9)
To circumvent the detection method in (5.4), the attack vector should be constructed as
a = h(x+ c)− h(x). (5.10)
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rNa,i ≤ λ. (5.11)
Here, we refer to the attack as an unobservable FDIA with a well-structured attack vector
a that enforces (5.11). By launching such an FDIA, the attacker can inject estimation errors
without being detected by the conventional LNR test.
5.3. Construction of FDIA
To evaluate the FDIA detection capability, this section introduces an unobservable attack
construction method in distribution systems. Assuming that an attacker has limited ability
to hack into meters, they can use the attack method proposed in [44] for constructing FDIAs
without paying high calculation costs.
Emerging research indicates that approximately linear models for state estimation in dis-
tribution systems exist and provide convenience for hackers to launch unobservable FDIAs,
e.g., [44,89]. Specifically, the linear formulas in these DSSE methods approximate the nodal
voltages in equivalent current measurements as the substation voltage V slack. This approxi-
mation originates from two observations for distribution systems: 1) the voltage magnitudes
are close to each other, i.e., 0.95 ∼ 1.05 p.u., and 2) the voltage phase angle differences are
very small, such as 0.1 degrees per mile. Take the three-phase power flow measurement at
branch i-j, Sij, as an example, convert the power measurement into an equivalent current
measurement by I ij eq ≈ (Sij/V slack)∗, and then the measurement function can be expressed
as
h(x) = Y ij(vi − vj) ≈ I ij eq (5.12)
where Y ij ∈ C3×3 denotes the nodal admittance between nodes i and j, which is constant,
and hence, h (x) is linear about the state variables x = {vi,vj}; [·]∗ denotes the complex
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conjugate.
More details of the linear approximation can be found in Section 5.2.2. Then, due to the
existence of the nearly linear relationship in DSSE, the estimator (5.1) can be expressed in
a linear form as
z̃ = Hx̃+ e (5.13)
where z̃ and x̃ denote the measurement and the closed-form estimated vector.
When the attack vector a is injected, the compromised measurement residual ra can be
expressed as [44]
ra = z̃a −Hx̃ = z̃ + a−H [x̂+ (HTWH)
−1
HTWa] (5.14)
If a = Hc, the compromised measurement residual ra after the attack is the same as
the measurement residual r before the attack, as follows.
ra = z̃ −Hx̂+Hc−H(HTWH)
−1
HTWHc = z̃ −Hx̂ = r (5.15)
If the residual r can bypass the LNR test, the compromised residual ra with malicious
data can also bypass this test by (5.11). Furthermore, to construct an attack vector that
meets a = Hc, let A = H(HTH)
−1
HT and A ∈ RM×M , and solve a by the following
equation:
Aa = AHc↔ Aa = a↔ Ba = 0 (5.16)
where B = A − I and I is an identity matrix. Assume that the maximum number of
measurements that hackers can compromise is K, and express the attack vector as a =
[0, ai1 , . . . , 0, aik , . . . , 0]
T and 0 <k ≤ K. Also, the elements ai with i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} are
the unknown variables to solve. Then Ba = 0 is equivalent to B′a′ = 0, where a′ is
80
the k-dimension vector that removes zero-value elements in a, and B′ is the matrix that
removes the corresponding columns at the locations related to these zero-value elements
in a, B′ ∈ RM×k. If rank(B′) < k, there is at least one non-zero solution in B′a′ = 0.
Moreover, a′ can be obtained by a′ = (I−B′+B′)d, where B′+ is the pseudo inverse of B′,
and d is an arbitrary non-zero vector, d ∈ Rk×1.
Attackers can successfully launch unobservable attacks by the attack model (5.16). There-
fore, the mechanism for detecting the unobservable FDIAs demands an effective solution.
5.4. Proposed Detection Mechanism
This section proposes a deep learning mechanism for detecting unobservable FDIAs in
three-phase distribution systems; Fig. 5.1 provides an overview of the proposed AAE-based
detection mechanism. We define the detection problem for unobservable FDIAs or outliers




0 if a = 0
1 if a 6= 0
(5.17)
In the AAE-based detection algorithm, the measurement vector z including three-phase
voltages, currents, and powers are collected as the inputs of AAE, where only a limited
number of them is labeled with α = 0 or 1. Compared with the conventional LNR test, the
learning-based detection method is fully data-driven and does not require the knowledge of
system knowledge of topology and parameters, i.e., h(x). Furthermore, we train the AAE
network to extract the node-to-node and phase-to-phase features of normal and abnormal
data, and then detect the presence of an unobservable FDIA. To evaluate the detection
performance, we generate unobservable attacks by the method introduced in Section 5.3,
while the normal dataset comes from the nonlinear distribution system model in Section
2.2.2.
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Figure 5.1. An overview of the proposed FDIA detection mechanism
Figure 5.2. Structure of autoencoders with three fully connected hidden layers
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5.4.1. Autoencoders and GAN
1) Autoencoders
Autoencoders are widely used for dimension reduction and feature extraction of highly
dimensional and correlated data [92]. Fig. 5.2 shows a classical structure of autoencoders,
including an encoder and a decoder. Specifically, the autoencoders learn a mapping from an
input X to a hidden code Y and the mapping is parameterized as q(Y |X) = q(Y |X;θ)
with the parameters θ that we want to learn.
Define p (X) as the prior distribution and p(Y ) as the prior distribution that we want
to impose on the code. The encoding function of the autoencoders q(Y |X) defines an




where pd (X) denotes the data distribution of X.
Encoder: The mapping fθ transforms the input X into Y and is expressed as
fθ(X) = s(wXj + b) (5.19)
where w and b denote the weight matrix and offset vector, respectively, and θ = {w, b},
w ∈ Rh×M , and b ∈ Rh×1; h denotes the number of the hidden units; Xj ∈ RM×1 is the jth
vector of the input samples X, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nd}, and X ∈ RM×Nd , where Nd is the number
of these samples; s(·) denotes the squashing nonlinearity of the neural network.
Decoder: The hidden code Y is then mapped back to a reconstruction X ′ in the input
space, i.e.,X ′ = gθ′ (Y ). This mapping gθ′ is called the decoder, and based on the parameters
θ′ = {w′, b′}, it is shown as
gθ′(Y ) = s(w
′Y + b′). (5.20)
The autoencoders optimize the network parameters by minimizing the mean square error
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‖X −X ′‖2 (5.21)
The parameters θ and θ′ are usually backpropagated by stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) in the training process. The convergence proof of autoencoders can be found in [93].
2) GAN
GAN establishes a min-max adversarial game between two neural networks, a generator,
G, and a discriminator, D, shown as Fig. 5.3. The generator produces the measurement
data samples (fake samples) that follow the distribution of the original training data (real
samples), while the discriminator distinguishes between the generated data samples and
these real samples. In a nutshell, GAN is alternatively trained in two stages: a) update
the discriminator with fixed generator parameters to distinguish the real samples from the
generated samples, and b) update the generator with the fixed discriminator parameters
to fool the discriminator with its generated fake samples. The solution of the two-player
game is globally optimal, and [90] provides the proof of this optimality and the convergence
analysis.
Because of limited labeled measurements available for training in practical power systems,
we use GAN to aid the autoencoders in shaping the hidden code for accurately detecting
FDIAs, which is detailed later.
5.4.2. Adversarial Autoencoder
This section introduces the structure of AAE and its training procedure for FDIA de-
tection. Here, the input X is a measurement dataset with P labeled samples {(z1, α1) ,
(z2, α2) , . . . , (zP , αP )} and Q unlabeled samples {zP+1, zP+2, . . . ,zP+Q}, where αp = 0 or
1 denotes the label of the pth set of measurements, p = 1, . . . , P and P  Q. As the
inputs of AAE, X ∈ RM×Nd , where M is the number of measurements in (5.1) and here the
number of the samples Nd = P + Q. Each sample of z is further represented in the neural
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Figure 5.3. The learning process of GAN
networks by Xj, and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nd}, shown in (5.19).
In AAE, the encoder learns how to encode a given data into a prior distribution, while the
decoder learns a deep generative model that matches the aggregated posterior distribution of
the hidden representation from the encoder to an arbitrary prior distribution. Fig. 4 shows
the combination and division of work of the autoencoders and GAN in the attack detection
task.
In Fig. 5.4, Y l and Y u denote the hidden representation for the labeled and unlabeled
inputs, and qθ (Y u,Y l |X) and pθ′(X|Y u,Y l) denote the encoder and decoder in this semi-
supervised learning, respectively. Assume the data generated by Y l and Y u, named Y
′
l and
Y ′u, follow a two-dimensional categorical distribution for the binary classification problem in
(5.17) and Gaussian distributions, respectively, i.e.,Y ′l ∼ Cat(2) and Y ′u ∼ N(0, I). Here,
adding the Gaussian noises is to stabilize the GAN training [90]. Also, we assume that the ag-
gregated posteriors p (Y l) and p (Y u) obey Gaussian distributions. To match the aggregated
posterior to the prior distributions of the mixture data, the encoder qθ (Y u,Y l|X) works
as the generator of GAN. In the meantime, the adversarial network has two discriminators,
Dcat and Dgauss, for the labelled and unlabeled inputs, respectively.
We train the AAE network at three stages: the reconstruction phase, the adversarial
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Figure 5.4. Semi-supervised AAE architecture: (a) in reconstruction phase, (b) in adversarial
phase, and (c) in supervised phase.
phase, and the supervised phase [94]. The batch normalization technique is used to improve
the training speed, performance, and stability of neural networks. We introduce the training
procedure of AAE below and show it in pseudo-code.
1) Reconstruction Phase
The AAE detector first works as traditional autoencoders in this phase, shown in Fig.
5.4(a), and both the encoder and decoder are trained to minimize the total reconstruction
loss, LR, for the labeled and unlabeled inputs X as in (5.21).
2) Adversarial Phase
In this phase, the encoder qθ (Y u,Y l|X) is reserved for training the discriminators and
generator, illustrated in Fig. 5.4(b) the discriminators Dcat and Dgauss to distinguish the true
samples of the categorical from Gaussian priors from the generated samples. Here, the goal
of a discriminator is to maximize the probability that Y l or Y u comes from the generated
data rather than from the true sample distribution, i.e., its confidence score. Hence, we
formulate the loss function of Dcat for the labeled data as
maxDcatV (Dcat, G) = EY ′l∼Cat(2) [logDcat (Y
′
l)] + EYl∼p(Y l) [log (1−Dcat (G (Y l)))] (5.22)
where EY ′l and EY l denote the expectations under the corresponding distributions.
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Then, we express the loss function of the generator G as maxG V (Dcat, G) = EY l∼p(Y l)
[logDcat (G (Y l))], which is equivalently written as
min
G
V (Dcat, G) = EY l∼p(Y l) [log (1−Dcat (G(Y l)))] . (5.23)




EY ′l∼Cat(2) [logDcat (Y
′
l)] + EYl∼p(Y l)[log(1−Dcat (G (Y l)))] (5.24)









u)] +EY u∼p(Y u) [log (1−Dgauss (G(Y u)))] (5.25)
3) Supervised Phase
Using only the labeled data, the autoencoders continue to update the encoder network,
shown in Fig. 5.4(c). Train the encoder for the labeled data by minimizing the cross-entropy
as the supervised cost by
min
θ
LS = Eq(Y l)[−log p(Y l)] (5.26)
where the aggregated posterior distribution q(Y l) is calculated by (5.18), and p(Y l) is the
distribution of Y l inherited from the results in the adversarial phase. During this train-
ing, we use the Adam optimization technique to computes adaptive learning rates for each
parameter. Adam is straightforward to implement and computationally efficient and has
little memory requirements [95]. This technique is widely used as a replacement of SGD in
the application research of GAN [90], especially for the optimization of objective functions
with high-dimensional parameters spaces. Specifically, Adam computes bias-corrected first
and second moment estimates. We provide the pseudo-code of Adam, where the default
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hyperparameters in [95] are used.
Algorithm 2 AAE Training Process
1: Input:Learning rate γ, mini-batch size, the number of epochs.
2: for t = 1 to Nep do
3: Sample mini-batch.
4: Reconstruction Phase
5: Calculate LR by (5.21) and update θ and θ
′ by descending the gradients:
fθ ← ∇θLR,θ ← θ − γ Adam (fθ)
gθ′ ← ∇θ′LR,θ′ ← θ′ − γ Adam (gθ′)
6: Reconstruction Phase
Obtain the hidden representation of the encoder qθ (Y u,Y l|X) and sample from the
prior distributions, and calculate the confidence scores of Dgauss and Dcat.
Discriminator: Train the discriminators to update their network parameters when
fixing the generator parameters
Generator: Update qθ (Y u,Y l|X) as the generator with the fixed discriminator pa-
rameters.
7: Supervised Phase: Using only the labeled data, update the encoder to minimize LS
by (5.26).
8: end for
9: Output:the encoder qθ(·).
5.5. Case Study
We test the proposed AAE-based algorithm on three-phase unbalanced benchmarks:
IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems [25]. These systems are modified by adding
DG units; more details about the location and types of these DG units are provided in [20].
The measurement arrangement of these systems is listed in Table 5.1. The true values of mea-
surements and states are obtained by running power flow program and DSSE in MATLAB,
and the proposed AAE-based algorithm runs in Python. Measurements with noises consist
of voltage phasors, current phasors, and complex powers, and these measurement noises obey
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Table 5.1. Measurement locations in test system
Measurement Placement Locations
Types 13-bus System 123-bus system
Power Flow
650-632,645-646, 149-1,9-14,15-16,18-35, 44-45,
684-652 76-77, 86-87, 99-100, 110-112
Power Injection 8 load/DG nodes 91 load/DG nodes
Voltage/currents
650, 671
149, 14, 18, 25,
from PMUs 60, 76, 97, 108
Gaussian distributions [96]. Specifically, the maximum meter noises of PMUs [52] are 1%
of the true values for voltage/current magnitudes and 0.01 rads for the phase angles, and
assume that a PMU measures the nodal voltage and the currents at the branches connected
to this bus; the measurement errors of power data at limited branches and all load/DG nodes
from smart meters are 3% of the true values [97].
Dataset Structure: The input of the proposed AAE detector is the collection of the
measurement vector z. In the modified 13-bus system, there are 11 nodes by closing the
switch installed at the branch 671-692; the state vector, x∈R66×1, is composed of the three-
phase voltage magnitudes and voltage phase angles, and 17 measurement phasors in Table
5.1 produce a measurement vector, z∈R102×1. In the modified 123-bus system, there are 119
nodes due to three normally closed switches and one normally open switch; x∈R714×1 and
z∈R870×1. We record 5,000 sets of measurements from Monte Carlo simulations and generate
other 5,000 sets of measurements under unobservable FDIAs by the attack construction
methods proposed in Section 5.3 and [8]. In the training process, 80% of measurements are
chosen as the training dataset and the rest are used for evaluating detection performance.
Further, for semi-supervised learning, we label 1,000 sets of measurements with a ratio of
1:1 as the secure and attacked data. These secure and attacked data are fed to the proposed
AAE detector for offline training.
Neural Network Specification: The learning rate is chosen as 0.0001, and the number of
epochs is 400. The encoder, decoder, and discriminators have two layers of 1,000 hidden units
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with a ReLU activation function, and a sigmoid activation function is used in the output layer
of the autoencoder. Y l and Y u are two-dimensional for the binary classification problem.
We use the Adam optimization method to train these neural networks with mini-batches of
64 samples for optimizing all the loss functions.
5.5.1. Unobservable FDIA
We investigate the detection performance of the conventional BDD method under unob-
servable attacks to show its insufficiency. Assuming that an attacker has access only to at
most K measurements from half the number of all meters, we randomly choose k in (0, K]
to generate a k-sparse attack vector a in these systems. Also, the DSSE method in Section
2.2.2 runs 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations under no attacks, and we choose the maximum of
rN in all trials as the detection threshold, λ0.
Fig.5.5 lists the results of the LNR test under these FDIAs in the 13-bus system, and we
compare these results with those with no attacks. We find that these FDIAs are unobservable
by the LNR test, since all the residuals are located under the detection threshold. For
instance, we construct FDIAs targeting on the A-phase and C-phase voltages at buses 611,
671, and 680 by constructing a sparse attack vector with k = 4, and Fig.5.6 shows the
estimated states under this unobservable attack. The unobservable FDIA can stealthily
compromise the state estimation for voltage magnitudes to make them violate the operation
ranges, e.g., below 0.95 p.u. at some buses in Fig.5.6. Estimated states with such significant
biases may mislead the decisions made by system operators for voltage regulation.
5.5.2. Detection Performance
Targeting at finding these FDIAs, we evaluate the detection performance of the proposed
method in the 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems. All simulation and training are
conducted on a computer with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
We calculate the true positive (TP), the true negative (TN), the false positive (FP), and
the false negative (FN) rates, which are defined in Table 5.2. For instance, TP denotes the
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Figure 5.5. The LNR results under unobservable FDIAs and no attacks
 
Figure 5.6. Estimation results of voltages under no attacks and an unobservable attack
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Table 5.2. Definitions of performance indices
Attacked Secure
Classified as attacked TP FP
Classified as secure FN TN
probability that a measurement classified as attacked is actually exposed to an attack. We
evaluate the learning ability of the proposed method by the values of precision (Prec), recall
(Rec), and accuracy (Acc) [85]. The precision values are used to evaluate the classification
performance for the attacked measurements, while the recall values measure the probabil-
ity that the secure measurements are not misclassified as attacked. The overall detection











TP + TN + FP + FN
(5.29)
Table 5.3 shows the detection accuracy, training time, and detection time of the proposed
method in two test systems. The proposed algorithm used for detecting the attacked metering
data has a detection error of 3.75% in the 13-bus system, while the detection error is 2.15%
in the 123-bus system. Also, the average computation time of the proposed method is 9.30
and 14.81 milliseconds in the 13-bus and 123-bus systems, which can satisfy the requirement
of online detection. Without the use of graphics processing unit (GPU), the training time
reaches about four hours in the 123-bus test system. Moreover, we further try the fine-tuning
technique [98] for neural network training based on the original hardware configuration, the
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Table 5.3. Detection performance of proposed algorithm
Performance 13-bus System 123-bus system
Training Labeled 100% 100%
Accuracy Unlabeled 96.35% 98.95%
Detection Accuracy 96.25% 97.85%
Average Detection Time 9.30 ms 14.81 ms
Training Time 2.5 hours 4 hours
new training process shows that this time (four hours) is shortened to less than two hours.
5.5.3. Other Semi-supervised Techniques
To evaluate the detection performance of the proposed AAE method, we compare the pro-
posed method with other data-driven detection techniques. We employ the semi-supervised
support vector machine (S3VM) proposed in [85] for attack detection as the baseline. More-
over, for a fair comparison, we adopt the semi-supervised autoencoders (SS-AE) and update
the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) method [99] into a semi-supervised version.
Table 5.4 lists the detection performance of these methods. With limited labeled data for
training, our approach has a higher detection accuracy owing to the powerful combination
of autoencoders and GAN. For instance, the proposed algorithm achieves a high detection
accuracy of up to 95%, while the S3VM-based scheme has a worse performance with a de-
tection accuracy of less than 80%. Our conclusion is similar to that of Ozay et al. [85] that
extensive unlabeled samples in the training dataset largely degrade the classification perfor-
mance of the SVM method. Moreover, owing to the adoption of the advanced generative
models in AAE, the detection accuracy of the proposed method is higher than that of the
individual SS-AE algorithm without the use of generative models. Therefore, the proposed
method is more competitive.
5.5.4. Impacts of Measurement Noises
To test the robustness against measurement noises in the proposed detection method, we
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Table 5.4. Comparison with other semi-supervised methods
Semi-supervised Algorithm
Detection Accuracy [%]
13-bus System 123-bus system
Proposed Method 96.25 97.85
S3VM [85] 73.60 76.65
k-NN [99] 84.90 86.55
Autoencoders [92] 91.85 92.40
investigate the impact of various noise levels of measurement data on the detection accuracy
in the 123-bus distribution system. In the case with no installation or malfunction of smart
meters at load/DG nodes, we use pseudo-measurements with higher errors (e.g., 10% of the
true values), which are obtained from the historical or forecasting data of customer loads
and DG production, to realize the system observability. In experiments, the maximum errors
of the power measurements are set to vary from 4% to 12%. Fig. 5.7 shows the detection
results of the proposed method, SS-AE, and S3VM under these noise levels.
It implies in Fig.5.7 that the proposed algorithm achieves a detection accuracy of more
than 94% even with the maximum measurement errors of up to 12% of the true values; this
finding illustrates the robustness of the proposed detection method against measurement
noises. In comparison, the detection accuracy of the SS-AE and S3VM approaches decreases
when dealing with higher measurement errors. We conclude that the detection accuracy of
the proposed method still remains high when the noise level of the test dataset increases
in distribution systems. This is because the adopted generative model has the capability of
better shaping the distribution of the hidden code of autoencoders to make the measurement
data distinguishable.
5.5.5. Sensitivity Analysis
1) Impact of Amount of Labeled Data
We investigate the detection performance when using relatively fewer labeled data during
the training. We set the different amount of the labeled data, ranging from 500 to 1250 in
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Figure 5.7. Detection accuracy with maximum measurement errors ranging from 4% to 12%.
Table 5.5. FDIA detection with fewer or more labeled data
Number of labeled data Prec [%] Rec [%] Acc [%]
500 91.17 92.26 91.70
750 93.18 94.98 94.15
1000 94.16 96.78 96.25
1250 95.47 97.83 96.70
the 13-bus test system. Table 5.5 provides the confusion matrix and evaluation indices of
the proposed algorithm, in which the number of training samples is 8,000. More labeled data
during the training leads to a more accurate detection performance. However, with 500 sets
of data labeled, the proposed method detects the unobservable FDIAs with precision, recall,
and accuracy values of about 91.17%, 92.26%, and 91.70%, respectively, which illustrates
the detection effectiveness of this method.
2) Impact of Different Attacks
Considering that there are some potential FDIAs that are not fully investigated and thus
are not labeled in the training stage, we test the detection performance towards new attacked
samples. New attacked samples here are defined as those that are not labeled in the training
stage and produced by different attack construction methods from that of those historical
known FDIAs. This case study can be summarized as “using few attacked samples to detect
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Table 5.6. Data structure in sensitivity analysis
Data in Number of Number of attacked data
stage of normal data From [5] From [20]
Training Labeled 8% 0 2%
(8000) Unlabeled 78% 2% 10%
Test (2000) 50% 40% 10%
∗ The numbers in the brackets denote the size of the samples.
Table 5.7. Comparison of detection performance in two cases
Performance with Number of labeled attacked data
400 training epochs 400 160
Training Labeled (800) 100% 100%
accuracy Unlabled (7200) 95.75% 93.15%
Detection accuracy 94.95% 91.60%
∗ The numbers in the brackets denote the size of the samples.
more new samples” by adopting the generative models.
Specifically, the attacked samples with labels in the training dataset are only from the
construction method in [44], and the ratio of these samples to all the training samples is low,
i.e., 2%, shown in Table 5.6. Furthermore, we use the method in [8] to constructs different
attacks from those labeled samples, and these attacked samples without attaching labels are
randomly chosen and put in the training and test dataset as new attacks. These details of
the adopted training and test datasets are shown in Table 5.6, and here only 160 attacks are
labeled. Other settings are the same as Section 5.5.1.
Shown in Table 5.7, the detection accuracy of the unlabeled data in the training decreases
to 93.15%, compared with 95.75% in the case study where 400 attacks are labeled in the
total 800 labeled data. In the test stage, the proposed method detects the unobservable
FDIAs with an accuracy of 91.60% in the 123-bus system. We conclude that the limited
attacked data that are labeled in the training process degrade the detection performance of
the semi-supervised learning.
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Table 5.8. Confusion matrix of FDIA detection with fewer labeled data
Actual Classified Classified Prec Rec
label as attacked as secure [%] [%]
Attacked (994) 923 71
92.86 90.49
Secure (1006) 97 909
∗ The numbers in the brackets denote the size of the samples.
More details about the test performance can be found in Table 5.8. These “new attack”
influence the recall value more obviously, and this index is 90.49%. However, the detection
performance of the proposed algorithm might be acceptable, since only 2% of the attacked
data is labeled in the training stage.
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter proposes a semi-supervised AAE-based algorithm for detecting FDIAs in
smart distribution systems. In the case of only a small fraction of labeled measurement
data, the proposed method leverages a state-of-the-art GAN framework to realize the effec-
tive detection of unobservable FDIAs that bypass the conventional BDD method. Compared
with other semi-supervised learning techniques, the proposed algorithm has a high and ro-
bust detection accuracy owing to the powerful combination of autoencoders and GAN. The
proposed detection method is fully data-driven and does not depend the specific estimation




Deep Reinforcement Learning Based Volt-VAR Control in Smart Grids
6.1. Introduction
Electric power systems currently adopt volt-VAR optimization (VVO) to improve oper-
ational efficiency and reduce power losses in distribution systems. About 10% of the energy
losses occur during transmission and distribution to customers, while 40% of the total losses
occur at the distribution side, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration [100].
Research shows that effective VVO control on various regulating devices, such as automatic
voltage regulators (AVRs) and switchable capacitors, can realize voltage regulation as well
as loss reduction. As a typical tool in the distribution management system (DMS), the
primary goal of VVO is to keep voltages at all buses within a normal operation range, e.g.,
0.95∼1.05 p.u., according to ANSI C84.1 standard. This topic is further motivated by the
penetration of distributed generation (DG), since bidirectional power flow in active distri-
bution systems raises the risk of voltage violation [101]. The DG units equipped with smart
inverters have the flexible capability of absorbing or providing reactive power [102]. Thus,
a VVO tool with an effective control strategy on these smart inverters can enhance the
operational performance of distribution systems with DG penetration [103].
Traditionally, VVO is modeled as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) prob-
lem established on optimal power flow (OPF) [104]. Due to the existence of integer variables
and nonlinear voltage-dependent load models in systems, the VVO formulation is nonconvex
and NP-hard [105]. More research converts this problem to various optimization problems,
namely, mixed-integer quadratically constrained quadratic programming (MIQCQP) and
mixed-integer quadratic programming (MIQP), etc. [106, 107]. However, the iteration pro-
cess in these methods is time-consuming. This low computational efficiency originates from
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two reasons: 1) the comprehensive modeling of various control devices largely increases the
complexity of these optimization models, and 2) the combination of action variables from
multiple control devices results in a huge searching space [108]. On the other hand, these
studies run in a centralized manner and adopt linear or nonlinear power flow formulation
for single-phase distribution systems to simplify the modeling complexity, such as [104–107]
and [109–112]. However, the three-phase unbalanced operation of distribution systems is
more consistent with practice, and these approaches can be computationally demanding and
do not guarantee optimal performance.




ZIP Accurate three-phase Smart
load power flow inverters agent(s)
[108] X × × -
Model-based [113] × X × Multiple agents
[114] X × X -
DRL-based
[115,116] × × × Single agent
This Chapter X X X Multiple agents
To reduce the computational burden of these centralized algorithms, the decentralized
or hierarchical methods, such as [108], [113], and [114], are used for VVO in unbalanced
distribution systems. For instance, dividing the feeder into several regulating zones, the au-
thors of [108] formulated a linearized power system model to solve a zone-based optimization
problem in each stage via MIQP and then performed a multi-stage coordinated operation
to achieve the overall voltage regulation. Unfortunately, the iterations recorded in [108]
reach up to thousands and take hundreds of seconds due to this multi-stage operation. Also,
these approximation techniques may cause accuracy losses in power flow calculation and lead
to suboptimal control strategies. Recently, [114] develops a bi-level VVO formulation, and
the lower level models a MILP problem using a nearly linear power flow, while the upper
level solves a quadratically constrained nonlinear programming (QCNP) problem based on
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nonlinear power flow approximation.
The physical model-based methods mentioned above highly depend on specific optimiza-
tion models and have limited capability in rapidly adapting to time-varying DG/loads in
distribution systems. To address the limitations of these model-based approaches, recent ef-
fort applies reinforcement learning (RL) to power system operation, such as [117] and [118].
Furthermore, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) combining deep learning with RL is re-
garded as valuable alternatives to model-based methods, due to its strong exploration ca-
pability of neural networks (NNs) towards nonlinear high-dimensional searching spaces. For
example, the DRL-based methods proposed in [119] adaptively provide the voltage setpoints
for generators in transmission systems. However, the existing voltage control methods via
DRL, such as [119] and [120], only focus on adjusting voltage profiles without looking into
the potential of VVO in power loss reduction.
Recently, the authors of [116] extended their work in [115] and solved a constrained
Markov decision process for VVO in the DistFlow environment via a constrained soft actor-
critic algorithm. However, [116] and [115] do not consider voltage-dependent loads and smart
inverters installed at DG units, both of which are widely used in practical distribution sys-
tems with renewable integration [104,114]. On the other hand, the DistFlow equations may
suffer from high errors in power flow, loss, and voltage calculations in power networks with
heavy load and high renewable penetration [121]. Such inaccuracies are more pronounced
when operating power factors deviate from unity, e.g., in systems with DG participating in
voltage regulation or high r/x ratios. Also, coordinated VVO control on various regulating
devices has not been fully investigated in three-phase unbalanced distribution systems. A
literature review of the VVO methods in such systems is shown in Table 6.1. Most of the
existing RL-based VVO methods adopt a single agent, and if directly applied to larger-scale
systems with multiple regulation devices, they have a slower learning speed due to a huge
searching space of variables [122].
Targeting at auto-adaptive voltage control under time-varying operating conditions, we
propose a data-driven and model-free VVO approach via multi-agent DRL (MADRL) in
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unbalanced distribution systems. The proposed method is novel since we cast the multi-
objective VVO problem for distribution systems to an intelligent DQN framework. In this
framework, we consider the statuses/ratios of capacitors, AVRs, and smart inverters as action
variables. These actions are determined via the agents that are trained by interacting with
their environment, i.e., the distribution system. Moreover, by customizing a reward function
that effectively guides the DQN training process, this method realizes dual goals on power
loss reduction and voltage regulation simultaneously.
6.2. System Model of Unbalanced Distribution Networks
Unlike transmission systems, distribution networks have radial or weakly meshed topolo-
gies with lines of a high r/x ratio, which may make the traditional Newton-Raphson power
flow method fail to converge [21]. The efficient forward-backward sweep method provides
exactly accurate power flow results without any approximation, even in large-scale unbal-
anced distribution systems. Hence, this method is widely used in power flow calculation for
radial distribution systems.
We adopt the ZIP model in distribution systems, which is a voltage-dependent load
model widely used in related research, such as [112, 114]. The ZIP load models for active































where Pϕi and Q
ϕ
i denote the ϕ -phase active and reactive powers at bus i, respectively, and
ϕ = {a, b, c}; kp,1 +kp,2 +kp,3 = 1, and kq,1 +kq,2 +kq,3 = 1; Pϕi,0 and Q
ϕ
i,0 denote the ϕ -phase
active and reactive powers at the nominal voltage U0; |Uϕi | represents the ϕ -phase voltage
magnitude at bus i.
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We briefly introduce the procedure of the forward-backward sweep method for power flow
calculation in unbalanced distribution systems as follows:
1. Current Injection Calculation. Initialize three-phase voltages at all buses as the values
























k denotes the ϕ –phase complex power of load consumption or
DG production at bus k and is considered as the ZIP model in (6.1) and (6.2) ; Uϕk
denotes the ϕ -phase voltage at bus k in the current iteration, and k = 1, 2, . . . , N ; [·]∗
represents the complex conjugate.
2. Backward Sweep. Starting from the end bus of the feeder, we calculate the receiving-



















where N (m) denotes the set of the downstream branches connected to bus m, and Iϕl
denotes the sending-end current on phase ϕ at branch l.











 = cnmUm + dnmIm (6.5)
102




Y abcZabcY abc and dnm = I +
1
2
ZabcY abc; Zabc ∈ C3×3 denotes the three-phase
line impedance matrix at branch n- m, and Y abc ∈ C3×3 is the shunt capacitance
matrix; I denotes an identity matrix.
3. Forward Sweep. Starting from the root bus and moving towards the end bus of the












 = anmUn− bnmIn (6.6)
where anm = I +
1
2
ZabcY abc and bnm = Zabc.
The iterative procedure continues until the voltage differences at all nodes in two succes-
sive iterations satisfy
∆U k =





k denote the three-phase voltages at bus k at iterations t and t+ 1, and
ε denotes the iteration tolerance.
The flowchart of power flow calculation is shown in Fig. 6.1. Furthermore, we calculate





where Unm denotes the three-phase voltage drop at branch n-m, and Unm = Un−Um; Inm
is the three-phase current through the line impedance, and Inm = Z
−1
abcUnm; the function
real(·) takes the real part of the complex number, and (·)T denotes the transpose of a vector.
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Figure 6.1. Flowchart of the forward-backward sweep method
Power flow calculation requires prior knowledge of the network topology. For distribution
networks with an unknown topology, efficient topology identification methods, such as [123],
should be adopted for further system monitoring and control.
6.3. Proposed VVO Algorithm
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This section integrates the models of switchable capacitor banks, AVRs, and smart in-
verters into the power flow calculation to evaluate the impacts of the status changes of these
regulating devices on system operation. Leveraging these changes as control actions, we
propose a multi-agent DQN-based VVO method to realize effective voltage regulation and
power loss reduction.
6.3.1. Voltage Regulation Devices
1) DG With Smart Inverters
We develop a per-phase model of smart inverters installed at DGs. Various voltage control
strategies can be used in these smart inverters. Here, we assume these smart inverters adopt
the reactive power control (RPC) strategy, and voltage droop control can also be used by
updating the backward-forward sweep method.
i. RPC
Assume a DG unit with the smart inverter installed at bus k and the active power of DG
outputs is known, and its nominal per-phase capacity is Sϕdg,k. In RPC, the ϕ - phase reactive



















, and Pϕdg,k denotes the ϕ -phase active power;







range of Qϕdg,k is relatively narrow since a high power factor (e.g., 0.95) is preferable during
DG operation.
ii. Droop Control
In voltage droop control at bus k, the inverter output voltage U k are controlled by the
droop characteristics defined by the following equation [124]:
U k −U k,0 = kq(Qdg,k −Qk,0) (6.10)
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where U k − U k,0 denotes the three-phase voltage deviations from their rated values, U k,0;
Qdg,k − Qk,0 is the variation of the three-phase reactive powers delivered by the power
converter to compensate such deviations; the parameter kq represents the slope of the voltage
droop characteristic.
For each Qdg,k computed by the action that the proposed DRL agent gives, the nodal
voltage can be obtained by (6.10). The backward-forward sweep process can be further
modified for power flow calculation in droop-regulated distribution systems or microgrids by
using the method proposed in [125]. This process can be found in the dotted part of Fig.
6.1.
2) Capacitor Bank
We adopt the three-phase model of capacitor banks. Specifically, we define the reac-
tive power provided by the capacitor installed on phase ϕ as a function of the control
variable, aϕc ∈ {0, 1}, which indicates the status (on/off) of this capacitor. The capaci-
tor provides reactive power when it is connected, i.e., aϕc = 1, and the reactive power at bus







where Uϕk denotes the ϕ -phase voltage of the capacitor installed at bus k, and B
ϕ
k denotes
the susceptance of the capacitor on phase ϕ.
3) Voltage Regulator
A voltage regulator with a regulating range of ±10% is used in distribution systems, and
the series and shunt impedance of the voltage regulators are neglected since their values can
be regarded as extremely small [114]. Define aϕr as the step for the voltage regulator on
phase ϕ. For example, in a 32-step regulator, aϕr takes values between 0.9 and 1.1 at a step






where αj denotes the binary variable for the jth regulator step position, and
∑33
j=1 αj = 1 ;
bj ∈ {0.9, 0.90625, . . . , 1.1} and ϕ ∈ {a, b, c}.
For branch n - m that with the regulator installation, an additional bus n′ is introduced
between buses n and m. The impacts of the regulators installed at this branch on the voltage
Un and current In are quantified by [21]:
U ′n = ArUn (6.13)
I ′n = DrIn (6.14)
where U ′n denotes the three-phase voltage at bus n
′, and I ′n denotes the three-phase current
that flows out from this regulator; Ar = diag{aar , abr, acr}, and Dr = A−1r .




n at the locations of
regulators to run the forward and backward sweeps in (6.5) and (6.6).
To introduce the control strategies of smart inverters into the DQN-based VVO frame-
work, we discretize the action space of aϕdg to handle the performance of these actions in RL.
This processing method is widely accepted and used for flexible Q-learning or DQN appli-
cations, such as [126, 127]. Here, we suppose that DG operators have a certain number of
strategies for each control interval (6.9) in practice [128], and aϕdg can take values between
−1 and 1 at a step of 0.1.
Fully considering all setting changes of the capacitor banks, smart inverters, and AVRs,
the power flow calculation process in (6.3)-(6.7) is updated by integrating (6.9)-(6.14), along
with the voltage-dependent loads modeled by (6.1) and (6.2).
The objective of conventional VVO is to keep the nodal voltages in a normal range (e.g.,
0.95 to 1.05 p.u.) and concurrently minimize total active power loss [109, 110]. Hence, the
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optimization model for this purpose can be formulated as
a = arg min Ploss (6.15a)
s.t. unbalanced power flow equations in (5.1)-(5.7) (6.15b)
0.95 ≤ |Uϕk | ≤ 1.05 (6.15c)
where |Uϕk | denotes the voltage magnitude on phase ϕ at bus k, and ϕ = {a, b, c}; Ploss is
calculated by (6.8).
Under time-varying operating conditions, the effective power flow calculation acts as the
environment for DQN agents, and the details of the proposed VVO algorithm are shown in
the next section.
6.3.2. MADRL Design for VVO
In an RL process, a NN is defined as an agent, and the part where the agent takes control
actions is the environment. Massive episodes of training are applied to the agent, and in the
environment, the load consumption and DG production in a distribution system vary in each
episode. The agent is required to take control actions with respect to the given operating
condition to achieve VVO. The dimension of the action space increases explosively with the
number of controllable devices installed in the three-phase distribution system. Also, a single-
agent DQN is challenging to efficiently provide actions due to the extremely high dimension
of the joint action space [122]. To improve computational efficiency and ensure scalability
for VVO, we propose a multi-agent DQN-based algorithm. The interaction between multiple
agents and the environment is depicted via three elements: state s, action a, and reward rt
at episode t. We describe these elements for VVO below.
1) State and Action
The action vector for the VVO problem decided by all agents is expressed as
a = [a1, a2, . . . , aNi]
T (6.16)
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where ai denotes the control action that originates from the statuses of three-phase smart
inverters, regulators, or capacitors, i.e., aϕr , a
ϕ
c , and a
ϕ
dg, and ai ∈ Ai; Ai represents the
searching space of the ith action, and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Ni}.
For the action vector a provided by the agents, the environment provides three-phase
voltages at all buses in distribution systems, which act as the states of the DQN. Moreover,






k ] and k =
{1, 2, . . . , N}.
2) Reward
To solve the optimization model (6.15), we construct a reward interpreter of DQN by
putting the voltage constraints into the objective function. The proposed reward interpreter
has the following characteristics:
• If the constraint (6.15c) is violated, a significant penalty M is imposed on the reward
of the DQN, which moves the voltages into the normal range [109]. To accurately
quantize the voltage deviation degree in the whole distribution system, the reward






[max(|Uϕk | − 1.05, 0) + max(0.95− |U
ϕ
k | , 0) ] (6.17)
where the more significant the degree of voltage violation is, the more negative reward
the DQN agents obtain.
Remark. The primary goal of VVO is to make all voltage magnitudes within a normal
operating range. Otherwise, the VVO problem has no feasible solution. Therefore, before
calculating the power loss reduction, the proposed reward function firstly examines whether
the current actions lead to a voltage violation. The agents must avoid providing the actions
that result in the voltage violation as much as possible.








where P tloss denotes the active power loss based on the current action variables, and
P tloss,0 denotes the one that takes the default actions at episode t, both of which are
calculated according to the corresponding states; M+ > 0 denotes an incentive factor
that motivates the agents to obtain a greater positive reward; rt > 0 implies that the
proposed DQN further reduces the power loss after conducting the new action given
by the agents at episode t.
Remark. In the case of no voltage violation, we set the reduction of power losses compared
with the default settings of the regulation devices as the reward, rather than the absolute
power loss at the current episode. Doing so is to guarantee that the agents always attempt
to improve their policy based on the default actions, when facing new operational conditions.
Moreover, this design coordinates with voltage constraints in (6.15c) and make agents learn
in the direction of obtaining a greater positive reward. It is because either the voltage
violation or increasing power loss has a negative reward, which informs the agents that the
actions being taken are undesirable.
6.3.3. Multi-agent DQN Algorithm
This section describes the learning process of the proposed MADRL algorithm. The NN
structure of agent j is depicted in Fig. 6.2, where the input is state s, and the output is
the action to be taken by this agent. The NN-based agent is trained to learn the mapping
between the state and action, i.e., an action-reward Q function, by maximizing the possible
reward.
1) Multi-agent Operation
MADRL is capable of solving more complex tasks through the cooperation of individual
agents effectively. In our VVO framework, the agents’ training process can be summarized
as “centralized learning, decentralized execution”, which belongs to the concurrent learning
category in multi-agent training schemes and is computationally efficient [122]. Moreover,
the multi-agent DQN distributes the global control actions to each agent that performs
coordinated RL by exploring the shared environment. Specifically, each agent takes actions
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Figure 6.2. The NN structure for agent j.
based on their local observations, and the action choice is evaluated by the overall Q value
of the combined actions from all agents under a specific state.
Here, let j denote the serial number of an agent, and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n is the
number of agents. Considering various regulating devices, the actions of all the devices are
assigned to multiple agents, shown in Fig. 6.3; assume there are Nj actions in agent j. Due
to the existence of heterogeneous regulation devices, all agents can perform in parallel by
distributing the actions’ searching space as uniformly as possible, i.e., making the dimension
of the joint space in each agent close to each other. For example, we can assign one action of
a per-phase 32-step regulator to agent 1 and five actions from multiple capacitors to agent




= 25 = 32. It is noted that the agents require
no physical information of these actions, such as their locations and phases in the system.
When sent to the environment, these actions are executed at the corresponding locations for
effective power flow calculation.
During the learning process, efficient communication among these agents is conducted
to select the optimal actions via their shared observation of the current state s and the
latest action a, shown as Fig. 6.3. Moreover, the information exchange among the agents
is the current actions that these agents jointly take, a. In each training episode, based
on the current state s, the agents provide the new control actions to the environment.
Specifically, in agent j, the new action participating in the local learning process is a′(j) =
111
Figure 6.3. Multi-agent DQN training loop
[a1, . . . , aj−1, a
′
j, aj+1, . . . , an]
T , where a′j is the latest control policy from this agent, and the
rest of the actions ai, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}\j, are reserved from the last episode. Then, collect
the control action a′j from a
′(j) in all these agents, and form the new action vector for the
whole distribution system, a′ = [a′1, a
′




The environment, i.e., the power flow calculation procedure, then implements the joint
action a′ and get a new reward and a new state s′, until the training process terminates.
2) Offline Training and Online Test
According to our customized reward function (6.17) and (6.18), the new state s′ and the
corresponding system power loss are interpreted into the immediate reward r after taking
action a at state s. For t = 1, 2, . . . , Nep, agent j updates the action-reward Q function at
episode t via the following Bellman equation:






where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount rate, and α denotes the learning rate of the DQN.
An experience replay technique is used to store the latest Nb sets of the agents’ experience
in episode t, i.e., the transition tuple (s,a, rt, s′), to a replay buffer M. We sample a mini-
batch memory D from the replay buffer to improve the generality of the agents towards
diverse states. The agent j is trained by D together with the current transition tuple.
Moreover, the stochastic gradient descent on NN parameters θj for the agent is conducted
using the following loss function Lj(θj), which enforces the Bellman equation (6.19):






where we define the target Q function as y=rt + γ · maxQtj(s′,a′) , and E(·) denotes the
expectation function.
The Q function iteratively updates following (6.19), shown as Qt+1j (s,a) = E(rt +
γmaxQtj(s
′,a′)). Such iterations converge to the optimal action-value function, Qtj → Q∗j as
t→∞ [129].
During the training process, we apply the ε-greedy policy [120] to select the actions effi-
ciently, as it encourages each agent to fully explore the corresponding action space. Specif-
ically, as the training continues, the action selection relies more on the action policy from
Qtj(s
′,a′), shown as:
aj = πj(s) =







where πj denotes the action selection policy for agent j, and 0 <ξ < 1 is a random number;
the searching criteria εt is updated based on the last episode by a decay factor η, i.e.,
εt = εt−1η.
The pseudo-code summarizes the offline training process of the proposed MADRL algo-
rithm. When the training process terminates, the agent j with parameter θ∗j is applied to
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the test cases, where new operating conditions in the distribution system are fed. For each







j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (6.22)
These actions from all agents are combined by (6.16) and given to the environment as the
solution of the model (6.15) for online system VVO control.
Algorithm 3 Multi-agent DQN Training Process
1: Input:Distribution system model and the action space Aj for agent j, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
2: Initialization: the learning rate α, the discount rate γ, the decay factor η, and the size
of replay buffer Nb.
3: for t = 1 to Nep do
4: Initialize state s, and obtain action a by the ε -greedy policy (6.21).
5: for j = 1 to n do
6: Get reward rt by (6.17) and (6.18), and new state s′ by power flow calculation, and
store them as a transition (s,a, rt, s′) in replay buffer.
7: Get the current Q vector at state s by agent j




, and i =
1, 2, . . . , Nd.
9: Set y = rt + γmaxQtj(s
′,a′)
10: Train and update agent j by performing gradient descent on (20).
11: end for
12: end for
13: Output:All agents with parameters θ∗j .
6.4. Case Study
We test the proposed algorithm on the radial three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and
123-bus distribution systems [25]. We modify the 13-bus system by adding two single-
phase PV units at buses 675 and 684, and a three-phase wind turbine generator at bus
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Figure 6.4. Three-phase unbalanced 13-bus distribution system
680, illustrated in Fig. 6.4. Six DG units are added at buses 13, 18, 60, 151, 250, and
300 in the 123-bus systems, and the installation capacity of these DG units is set as 300 or
500 kVA [130]. Here we randomly place the DG units, and similar settings are also used
in [130] and [15]. The optimal placement method of DGs can be found in [131] and is not
the focus of this chapter. Table 6.2 lists the specifications of control devices, including smart
inverters installed at the DG units in both test systems. We can see that taking the action
variables for all these devices into account results in high-dimensional joint decision space.
We assume that there is no distinction on the per-phase action of regulators located on the
same bus, and this assumption also applies on the smart inverters. For example, in the
13-bus system, all six actions produce a 24 × 21 × 33 = 11, 088 combinations of all these
actions; for the 123-bus test system, and the dimension of the combinations of all 13 actions
is 26 × 53 × 54 = 5, 000, 000. The details of the adopted multiple agents can be found in
Table 6.3.
In the baseline, the actions are initially set as default to calculate (6.18), where no
capacitor bank is connected in these systems, and the steps of AVRs and the power factors
of smart inverters are set as 1 as default [132]. The proposed algorithm runs in MATLAB
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Table 6.2. Installation settings of control devices
Device Type
13-bus System 123-bus System








611 C 88 A
675 A,B,C 90 B
92 C
13 C
Smart Inverters 684 C 18 A,B,C
16 A,B,C
by using the Reinforcement Learning Toolbox, and we build the learning environment, i.e.,
three-phase distribution system operation. The load data are collected at each node from
smart meters in the test systems, according to [116] and [115]. For offline training and online
test, we randomly generate 9,000 and 13,000 operating conditions (episodes) with 80% to
120% of random fluctuations of base loads/DGs in these two systems, respectively [120].
Moreover, in the test phase, new operating conditions are used as test cases, and Table 6.3
gives the number of training episodes and test cases, Nep and Ntest.
DQN Specification: The NNs used here have three fully connected layers, and the learning
rate is chosen as 0.0001. The NN agents in the proposed method use rectified linear unit
(ReLU) activation functions in the hidden layers and sigmoid functions in the output layer.
Table 6.4 also summarizes the parameters of the adopted multi-agent DQN in the two test
systems.
6.4.1. Learning Performance
We investigate the learning performance of the proposed method. We test the proposed
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Table 6.3. Parameter settings of multi-agent DQN
Parameter 13-bus System 123-bus system







N1 = 16 N1 = 64
Nj for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} N2 = 21 N2 ∼ N4 = 5
N3 = 33 N5, N6 = 25
M+ 1 10
M 100 100
algorithm on the 123-bus system, and Fig.6.5 shows the reward values in the training process
and moving average rewards in successive 200 episodes. We observe that the DQN agents’
control policies result in negative rewards (rt < 0) due to limited positive learning experiences
and not yet optimized action policies in an earlier learning phase. These negative rewards
illustrate that at the beginning, the action policies are incapable of maintaining the system
voltages within 0.95∼1.05 p.u. and reducing power loss at the same time, according to (6.17)
and (6.18). However, during the training process, the agents gradually evolve and obtain
positive rewards (rt > 0) more and more frequently. Moreover, rt > 0 implies that there
is no voltage violation and the power loss is further reduced by taking action a′, compared
with the performance before a′ is taken. Also, the average reward in the training process
continuously increases, which shows the DQN’s ability in realizing the VVO.
Furthermore, for online test, 4,000 new cases are fed to these trained agents. These
agents demonstrate an effective control performance for VVO, which is characterized by the
positive rewards in these cases, as shown in episodes from 9,000 to 13,000 of Fig. 6.5. We
conclude that the proposed DQN enables the power grid to self-learn with the “cognitive”
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function of VVO control by mimicking the human mind. Eventually, these trained agents
can implement effective control policies when confronted with new operating conditions.
Table 6.4. Performance of voltage regulation
System Scale Nv Mm Sv
13-bus System 998 1,000 99.8%
123-bus System 4,000 4,000 100%
Figure 6.5. Multi-agent DQN training process in the IEEE 123-bus system
6.4.2. VVO Performance
This section demonstrates the VVO performance of the proposed model-free MADRL
method when facing random operating conditions, in terms of voltage regulation and power
loss reduction, both of which are implemented online by this method simultaneously.
1) Voltage Regulation
To evaluate the voltage control performance of the proposed VVO method in the test
cases, we define the success rate in voltage regulation, Sv, as follows.
Sv = Nv/Mv (6.23)
118
where Mv denotes the number of those test cases that exist voltage violation before adopting
the proposed VVO algorithm, and Nv denotes the number of those cases that avoid the
voltage violation issue by using this method. Moreover,a higher Sv illustrates that the
proposed algorithm has a better control performance in voltage regulation.
Table 6.4 summarizes the statistical results of the proposed algorithm in test cases.
Specifically, before employing the proposed method in the 13-bus system, voltage violation
exists in the 1,000 test cases, and our algorithm achieves a control success rate of 99.80%
in voltage regulation. For a larger-scale three-phase 123-bus system, the VVO task becomes
more challenging due to the so-called “curse of dimensionality.” However, the proposed
MADRL method obtains a success rate of 100%.
We randomly select a test case in the 13-bus system to compare the voltage magnitudes
with the control from the proposed method and the baseline, and Fig. 6.6 depicts these
three-phase voltage magnitudes at each bus. It can be seen that in the baseline control, the
A-phase and C-phase voltage magnitudes at buses 611, 652, 671, 675, and 684 violate the
normal voltage operation limits; after adopting the control actions provided by the agents,
the voltages at all these buses fall within the normal operating range. Moreover, we compare
the voltage profiles with the control from the baseline and the proposed VVO method, in
terms of the minimum, maximum, and average of voltage magnitudes, in Table 6.5. It is
shown that the proposed method avoids voltage violation by jointly dispatching these devices,
and these DG units with smart inverters are directed to provide reactive powers for voltage
lift.
2) Power Loss Reduction
Here we show the performance of power loss reduction in those test cases that are dis-
cussed above for voltage regulation. Fig. 6.7 demonstrates the power loss of the baseline
and the proposed approach in 50 test cases that are randomly selected in the 13-bus system.
We conclude that the proposed method enables effective power loss reduction.
To further quantify the loss reduction performance in these two test systems, we calculate
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Figure 6.6. Three-phase voltage magnitude comparison before and after VVO control in the
13-bus system.
the reduction of power loss in each test case by
∆P i=P iloss,0 − P iloss (6.24)
where ∆P i denotes the difference in the ith test case between the active power losses with
the control strategies from the baseline and the proposed method, i.e., P iloss,0 and P
i
loss;
i = 1, 2, . . . , Ntest, and these active power losses are calculated by (6.8).
Table 6.6 summarizes the average and maximum of ∆P i in two test systems and implies
that the proposed method enables power loss reduction in all test cases. Specifically, in
the 13-bus system, the average power loss reduction obtained by the proposed algorithm
is 45.38 kW. In the 123-bus system, these statistic data are 75.23 kW for the mean power
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Figure 6.7. Power loss comparison before and after control in the 13-bus system.
posed DQN-based method effectively realizes dual goals on power loss reduction and voltage
regulation.
6.4.3. Computation Time
We carry out numerical experiments to investigate the computational efficiency of the
proposed method. All the tests are performed using MATLAB on the machine equipped
Table 6.5. Voltage comparison in the IEEE 123-bus system
Voltage Magnitude Profile [p.u.] Phase A Phase B Phase C
Min. Voltage 0.9070 0.9115 0.9191
Baseline Max. Voltage 1.0300 1.0300 1.0300
Aver. Voltage 0.9372 0.9526 0.9552
Min. Voltage 0.9710 0.9958 0.9819
The proposed method Max. Voltage 1.0393 1.0418 1.0421
Aver. Voltage 1.0002 1.0256 1.0213
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Table 6.6. Performance of power loss reduction
System Scale
Average Maximum The prop. of
∆P i [kW] ∆P i[kW] ∆P i > 0
13-bus System 45.38 67.79 100%
123-bus System 75.23 86.36 100%
with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
In the online test phase, the average executive time of all test cases in the 13-bus and
123-bus systems is 21.7 and 46.2 milliseconds, respectively, which is promising to meet with
the requirement of real-time implementation in power systems. The proposed algorithm still
shows the high computational efficiency in the unbalanced 123-bus system. Moreover, the
proposed MADRL method is competitive when dealing with a high-dimensional action space
that exists in three-phase distribution systems.
6.4.4. Comparison with Existing Reward Design
Besides the baseline, where all regulation devices keep their default actions, another
benchmark is set up by using the reward design proposed in [116], which does not consider
voltage regulation as the primary objective of VVO and directly uses the big penalty. For
a fair comparison in the DRL-based VVO methods, we adopt the following reward function
in this benchmark and apply the same environment and training conditions as the proposed
method.
rt = −P tloss −M [count( |U
ϕ
k | > 1.05 or |U
ϕ
k | < 0.95)] (6.25)
where P tloss denotes the power loss, and the function count(·) is defined as the number of
per-phase voltage violations across all nodes in episode t.
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Table 6.7. Comparison of voltage regulation in the 13-bus system





in the proposed method
(6.25) 1,000 90.02% 77.10%
Figure 6.8. The comparison of the learning performance for VVO
Table 6.7 compares the online test performances of both of the reward functions in the
multi-agent DRL approach. It is shown that with no consideration of the priority of voltage
violation in the VVO problem, the reward function in (6.25) may fail to avoid voltage
violation, and the average success rate in voltage regulation is only 90.02%. In contrast, the
proposed method has a 99.76% average success rate.
Fig. 6.8 depicts the learning performance of these two reward design schemes in five
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random experiments [115]. The dark-colored curves denote the average performances of
rewards in all these experiments, and the light-colored regions are the error bounds. We
conclude that with no consideration of the priority of voltage violation in the reward design,
the reward function used in (6.25) results in unstable learning performance for VVO.
6.5. Conclusion
This chapter proposes a novel and real-time DQN-based VVO algorithm in unbalanced
distribution systems. Integrating the voltage-dependent loads, DG penetration, and three
types of voltage regulating devices into distribution system operation, we establish the ef-
ficient power flow calculation as the environment of the DQN. Via the interaction between
the environment and multiple agents, the proposed VVO method adaptively chooses control
actions to enable voltage regulation and power loss reduction. This algorithm realizes a
promising VVO performance in two unbalanced distribution systems.
Several state-of-the-art policy gradient methods, such as proximal policy optimization
(PPO) [133], have the capability of further mitigating the scalability issue. On the other
hand, the proposed MADRL method can use the distributed learning by dividing the whole
distribution systems into multiple sub-areas to improve the control performance. The dis-
tributed control algorithms are already proposed in model-based voltage control methods




Conclusion and Future Work
7.1. Summary
To construct a next-generation smart grid, this dissertation explores novel methodologies
for the design, modeling, and application of situational awareness for distribution system
monitoring and control. The proposed situational awareness framework consists of a series of
promising solutions in distribution system state estimation (DSSE), cyberattack detection,
and voltage control. These solutions cover two aspects – methodological innovations and
interdisciplinary development using the state-of-the-art of applied mathematics and machine
learning, and they are summarized below:
• Methodology Innovation for Renewable Integration: We explore efficient math-
ematical analytic models and methodologies to address the uncertainty issue from high
penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in practical distribution system op-
eration. Chapter 2 proposes a highly efficient DSSE algorithm using the Taylor series of
complex numbers and interval arithmetic techniques. Furthermore, We discuss the im-
pacts of DERs on distribution system operation and the subsequent challenges. Chap-
ter 3 establishes a general interval state estimation (ISE) framework that considers
imprecise line parameters, measurements with noises, and uncertain DER outputs si-
multaneously. A modified Krawczyk-operator algorithm is proposed to solve these ISE
models and obtain the upper and lower bounds of state variables for better monitoring
systems under the coordinated impacts of these multiple uncertainties. Case studies
illustrate the proposed DSSE methods are capable of overcoming the ever-present poor
observability issue in the distribution management system (DMS) due to lack of me-
ters and stochastic outputs of renewables, and works conveniently with limited phasor
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measurement units (PMUs) in three-phase unbalanced distribution systems. Chapter
4 applies a distributed DSSE algorithm to faulted-line identification by integrating
PMU data. This method running in a distributed manner has lower computation cost
and enables fast faulted line identification within several tens of milliseconds. Our ap-
proach considers the impact of distributed generation (DG) penetration on distribution
system operation, and its location performance is independent of fault types and fault
impedances. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm is robust against high-level noises
in measurements.
• Knowledge Integration Through Interdisciplinary Studies: We expect to bridge
the gap between modern power system research and state-of-the-art communication,
machine learning (ML), and artificial intelligence (AI) techniques by using measure-
ment data from the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, PMUs,
and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) systems. The cyclic tendency of power
system operation exists, and the strong daily, weekly, and seasonal cycles ought to be
used for data mining and algorithmic training. As novel endeavors, we apply DSSE
to data-driven cyberattack detection via deep semi-supervised learning and generative
models in Chapter 5 and volt-VAR optimization (VVO) via multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning, represented by deep Q-networks, in Chapter 6. We show the proposed
data-driven situational awareness technologies, combining sophistication and flexibility,
are highly applicable to practical systems and have good potentials to improve opera-
tion efficiency in real-world power grids. Moreover, in the proposed DRL-based control
scheme for voltage regulation, dispatching DG outputs via smart inverters synergizes
with power loss reduction.
7.2. Technical Prospect and Outlook
Upon this dissertation, a hybrid model-based and data-driven situational awareness
framework is proposed. As far as methodology is concerned, the proposed ISE algorithms
can outperform the weighted least square (WLS)-based state estimation that is dominate
for a long time, in terms of the computational efficiency and superiority in capturing the
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effects of stochasticity and variability of renewable resources on DSSE. This method can
be further extended to other DSSE-based operational scenarios. Meanwhile, data-driven
and learning-based techniques are expected to upgrade the current monitoring and control
paradigm of distribution systems in broader DSSE applications. Taking the DER uncer-
tainty into account, distribution system monitoring and control still demand more plausible
and interpretable solutions. We discuss briefly future works in the following aspects, which
serve robust and reliable system operation facing more practical and harsh conditions:
• Topology identification. Topology identification in distribution networks is to de-
termine the connectivity among nodes in the case of unknown topology changes due
to network reconfiguration, repairs, maintenance, and load balancing. In practice,
distribution system operators (DSOs) might have partial or no knowledge of basic
network topologies, especially on the connectivity of DERs in secondary distribution
networks since the utilities may not own them. Furthermore, there are many ad-hoc
connections of plug-and-play DER components, which makes the problem even more
complicated. Some existing works in the literature, such as [135], formulate this prob-
lem as a mixed-integer programming problem, and however, how to leverage abundant
historical data from micro-PMUs or smart meters to identify the topology structure
by voltage correlation analysis awaits further investigation.
• Network parameter calibration. The assumption that network parameters are
accurate is a prerequisite in the conventional DSSE procedure. However, it is rarely
the case in practice, since the network parameters change in field ambient and aging
wirings. Higher penetrations of DERs call for improvement in the accuracy of those
varying parameters for accurate system monitoring and other line model-based appli-
cations. Therefore, parameter estimation procedures are designed to calibrate these
network parameters, also for avoiding manual inspections that are hard to carry out
in densely populated urban areas.
• State recovery with missing data. Missing measurement data at key buses, which
can be caused by various reasons such as sensor failures and unreliable communication,
are extremely possible to result in poor observability and even unobservability of system
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states. In this case, the existing DSSE methods fail to provide effective states for system
monitoring and control. Hence, reliable system operation demands an effective solution
to state recovery with missing data.
• Dynamic DSSE. With the increasing penetration of DERs, responsive loads, and mi-
crogrids, distribution systems are subject to different types of dynamics such as sudden
load shedding. The currently used steady-state power system models demand further
update to capture the system dynamics in a short time-frame [136]. Computationally
efficient and flexible dynamic state estimation approaches still urgently need to be
extended to distribution systems with high penetration of DERs.
• Data synergy and fusion of heterogeneous data. Distribution systems are under-
going a rapid growth of advanced metering infrastructure, especially the development
of PMUs and popularization of smart meters. Nevertheless, this leads to a compli-
cated scenario where a set of diverse sensors feed the DSSE with heterogeneous data
at different sampling and update frequencies. Furthermore, only a handful of efforts
are working to implement adaptive synchronization of multi-rate data for situational
awareness. There is an expectation about how the lagging SCADA data automatically
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Appendix A
PMU Latency for Faulted Line Identification
The proposed method in Chapter 4 leverages post-fault phasors from PMUs. Fig. A.1
shows the diagram of a waveform for fault currents and the latency of the proposed method
for faulted line identification. According to [68], considering the duration of transients, i.e.,
T1, there is a short latency between 0 and 20 ms before measuring the steady-state phasors by
PMUs. Later, to obtain accurate post-fault synchrophasors, the discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) method is used to process a dataset of raw-sampled waveforms [55], [137]. The time
window T2 for PMUs to get post-fault phasors is about two to three periods derived by a
fundamental frequency, e.g., 30 ms. Moreover, according to IEEE Standard C37.118, the














 Figure A.1. The diagram of a waveform of fault current and the latency of the proposed
method in identifying a fault.
131
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] M. Amini and M. Almassalkhi, “Trading off robustness and performance in receding
horizon control with uncertain energy resources,” in 2018 Power Systems
Computation Conference (PSCC), pp. 1–7, 2018.
[2] H. Jiayi, J. Chuanwen, and X. Rong, “A review on distributed energy resources and
microgrid,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 12, no. 9, pp. 2472–2483,
2008.
[3] “Distributed energy resources technical considerations for the bulk power system,”
2018.
[4] W. El-Khattam and M. M. Salama, “Distributed generation technologies, definitions
and benefits,” Electric power systems research, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 119–128, 2004.
[5] Y. Zhang, X. Wang, J. Wang, and Y. Zhang, “Deep reinforcement learning based
volt-var optimization in smart distribution systems,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2003.03681, 2020.
[6] Y. Zhang, J. Wang, and M. E. Khodayar, “Graph-based faulted line identification
using micro-PMU data in distribution systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
pp. 1–1, 2020.
[7] “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid — WIRED.
[Online]. Available: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-
hack-ukraines-power-grid/,” 18-Jul-2019.
[8] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1–33, 2011.
[9] Y. Zhang, J. Wang, and J. Liu, “Attack identification and correction for PMU gps
spoofing in unbalanced distribution systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 762–773, 2020.
[10] K. Dehghanpour, Z. Wang, J. Wang, Y. Yuan, and F. Bu, “A survey on state
estimation techniques and challenges in smart distribution systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 2312–2322, 2019.
132
[11] R. Singh, E. Manitsas, B. C. Pal, and G. Strbac, “A recursive bayesian approach for
identification of network configuration changes in distribution system state
estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1329–1336,
2010.
[12] S. J. Pappu, N. Bhatt, R. Pasumarthy, and A. Rajeswaran, “Identifying topology of
low voltage distribution networks based on smart meter data,” IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 5113–5122, 2018.
[13] C. N. Lu, J. H. Teng, and W. E. Liu, “Distribution system state estimation,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 10, pp. 229–240, Feb 1995.
[14] A. Primadianto and C. Lu, “A review on distribution system state estimation,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 32, pp. 3875–3883, Sep. 2017.
[15] H. Wang, W. Zhang, and Y. Liu, “A robust measurement placement method for
active distribution system state estimation considering network reconfiguration,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, pp. 2108–2117, May 2018.
[16] Evaluation of measurement data—Supplement 1 to the ’guide to the expression of
uncertainty in measurement’—Propagation of distributions using a Monte Carlo
method. JCGM YYY, 2006.
[17] A. K. Al-Othman and M. R. Irving, “A comparative study of two methods for
uncertainty analysis in power system state estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 1181–1182, 2005.
[18] J. Xu, Z. Wu, X. Yu, Q. Hu, and X. Dou, “An interval arithmetic-based state
estimation framework for power distribution networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Electronics, vol. 66, no. 11, pp. 8509–8520, 2019.
[19] A. Abur and A. G. Exposito, Power system state estimation: theory and
implementation. CRC press, 2004.
[20] Y. Zhang, J. Wang, and Z. Li, “Interval state estimation with uncertainty of
distributed generation and line parameters in unbalanced distribution systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 762–772, 2020.
[21] W. H. Kersting, Distribution System Modeling and Analysis. CRC Press, 2006.
[22] L. Yu, D. Czarkowski, and F. de Leon, “Optimal distributed voltage regulation for
secondary networks with dgs,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 2,
pp. 959–967, 2012.
[23] F. Flanigan, Complex Variables. Dover Books on Mathematics, New York, NY, USA,
2010.
[24] A. Neumaier, Interval Methods for Systems of Equations. Encyclopedia of
Mathematics and its Applications, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
133
[25] “IEEE test feeder specifications,” 2017. [Online]. available:
http://sites.ieee.org/pes-testfeeders/resources.
[26] S. Wang, L. Han, and L. Wu, “Uncertainty tracing of distributed generations via
complex affine arithmetic based unbalanced three-phase power flow,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 3053–3062, 2015.
[27] P. Pinson and G. Kariniotakis, “Conditional prediction intervals of wind power
generation,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 1845–1856,
2010.
[28] J. Liu, F. Ponci, A. Monti, C. Muscas, P. A. Pegoraro, and S. Sulis, “Optimal meter
placement for robust measurement systems in active distribution grids,” IEEE
Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 63, no. 5, pp. 1096–1105,
2014.
[29] C. Muscas, M. Pau, P. A. Pegoraro, and S. Sulis, “Effects of measurements and
pseudomeasurements correlation in distribution system state estimation,” IEEE
Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 63, no. 12, pp. 2813–2823,
2014.
[30] Y. Zhang, J. Wang, and Z. Li, “Uncertainty modeling of distributed energy resources:
techniques and challenges,” Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports, vol. 6,
no. 2, pp. 42–51, 2019.
[31] P. Chen, S. Tao, X. Xiao, and L. Li, “Uncertainty level of voltage in distribution
network: An analysis model with elastic net and application in storage
configuration,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 2563–2573, 2018.
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